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The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the




The seemingly interminable tacit assumptions about the nature of
language and the ontological status debate over originalism is grounded
on of the Constitution. It assumes that language represents the world,
that the Constitution is something that has an ontologically independent
existence, and that propositions of constitutional law are true if they
accurately represent the objective Constitution. This Article offers a
radical critique of those apparently obvious, commonsensical premises.
It presents an anti-representational, anti-foundational challenge to the
premises underlying the debate over originalism.
First, building on the work of Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom in
philosophy and Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson in jurisprudence, it
outlines how we might move beyond the notion of an ontologically
independent, objective Constitution. The alternative is to understand our
Constitution as constituted by our constitutional practices, particularly
our practices of constitutional argument and decision. Second, this
Article offers an analysis of propositions of constitutional law and their
truth, that explains such statements without the notion of representing the
objective Constitution and without the notibn that the truth of such
proposition is a matter of the accuracy of the representation by such
statements. Third, this Article presents and rebuts the arguments that
might be made against such an approach. It concludes by showing how,
in the face of this analysis, the tacit premises of the debate over
originalism collapse and with them, the debate over originalism as we
know it.
*© Andr6 LeDuc 2014. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and
not necessarily those of his partners or firm. I am grateful to Stewart Schoder and Laura
Litten for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, and to Charlotte Crane, Kristin
Hickman, and Dennis Patterson for helpful comments on some closely *related material.
Errors that remain are the author's own.
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This Article thus shows the path to transcend the debate, without
victory for either side. Attention to the tacit philosophical premises of
the debate over originalism, and the more plausible anti-foundational,
anti-representational alternative, allows us finally, after so many decades,
the possibility that we may leave this fruitless debate behind
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INTRODUCTION
Originalists and their principal critics share three fundamental
philosophical premises with respect to the relationship of language to the
world.1 Those shared premises are seemingly so well-established that
1. This claim is not original. Although it has been advanced before by a handful of
observers of the debate over originalism, the arguments made here for the claim have not
been made before. Moreover, it is a claim that has been largely rejected or ignored.
Philip Bobbitt advanced the claim in Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 700-02
(1980). See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALIsM 3-20 (2011) (defending the
primacy of the original understanding as a matter of constitutional interpretation);
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) (addressing the nature of legal
disagreement, but ignoring Bobbitt's work). I defend this claim about the shared
ontological assumptions of the debate over originalism in Andr6 LeDuc, The Ontological
[Vol. 119:1
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they attract almost no notice. Both sides in the debate over originalism
accept the tacit premise that he Constitution is ontologically independent
of our constitutional practice.2 Both sides also proceed on the premise
that language represents the world. These shared premises about he
nature of language and the nature of the Constitution allow both sides to
take for granted that the truth of propositions of constitutional law is
determined by the correspondence of those representational statements
with the constitutional world. The debate over originalism is
fundamentally a debate over the originalist claim to have correctly
described the Constitution and correctly stated the propositions of
constitutional law. The critics of originalism generally claim that the
originalist description is inaccurate and that many of the propositions of
originalist constitutional law are untrue because they are inconsistent
with the real Constitution. The fundamental differences between the two
competing views relate to the sources of constitutional law. The world
of constitutional law is much more circumscribed for the originalist than
for Ronald Dworkin and other leading critics of originalism, and the
nature of the linguistic representation of that world simpler.3 Dworkin,
for example, suggests that language is much more complex than the
Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JUR. REV. (forthcoming Mar.
2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological Foundations]. Dennis Goldford renewed this
claim from a seemingly different stance. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM, at x (2005) [hereinafter GOLDFORD,
DEBATE] (suggesting that Hegelian methodological strategies may be fruitful in
understanding the originalism debate). In fact, I think Goldford's argument, which is
ultimately grounded on the social activity of reason, is very close to the argument made
by Bobbitt, albeit expressed in a very different vocabulary; but our focus here does not
permit exploring the parallel further.
2. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It,
25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 88-89 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity]; RONALD
DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 37-39
(2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, ROBES]. For Bobbitt's identification of this shared
premise, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at xii (1991) [hereinafter
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (describing the argument of Constitutional Fate). This claim
is not uncontroversial, however, and will be defended below. See infra text
accompanying notes 424-427 and authorities cited there. For an analysis of the nature
and limits of this argument from the philosophical premises underlying the originalism
debate, see generally Andr6 LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law to
Philosophy: Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99
(2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Relationship].
3. It is simpler because the commonsensical approach of much of originalism
assumes that words refer to, or represent, things in the world, and that the truth of
propositions arises from such propositions correctly representing the state of the world.
While Dworkin endorses some of those claims, he does so with at least a tacit
acknowledgment that language is more complex than that simple account suggests.
Dworkin is nevertheless committed to such a realist account.
2014]
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originalists assume,4 and he sometimes uses that complexity to challenge
originalist claims.5 Nevertheless, at bottom, Dworkin is committed to a
representational account of our language and the view that it represents
6an objective world, including the objective Constitution.
While a representational account of constitutional language
underlies the originalism debate, some important contemporary
philosophers of language have criticized that general theory.7
Nevertheless, those anti-representational, anti-foundational thinkers
remain a minority within modem analytic philosophy, and their critics
offer important challenges to those anti-representational claims.8 The
anti-representational account has profound implications for the debate
over originalism; indeed, it calls the entire debate into question.9
I begin this Article by introducing and defending the anti-
representational, anti-foundational position. According to the anti-
representationalist, language is a tool speakers use to manipulate the
world, including each other, rather than a medium by which they
represent he world.10 As a result, propositions cannot be helpfully tested
against the world to determine either meaning or truth. Such a
pragmatist, functional account of language requires a theory of truth that
does not rely upon correspondence. According to Philip Bobbitt and
Dennis Patterson, in the case of propositions of constitutional law, that
4. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 117 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation] (simply noting that Justice Scalia's account
of constitutional language ignores all of the important work in contemporary analytic
philosophy of language).
5. Id. at 117 n.6 (simply citing certain important contemporary analytic
philosophers of language by name).
6. Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 95-97 (criticizing and purportedly
rebutting Rorty's claim that talking about whether mountains exist in an independent
reality is pointless). See generally LeDuc, Relationship, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 10-12 (1999)
[hereinafter GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE] (criticizing the argument, attributed to Rorty,
against truth based upon the claim that our reality is a matter of social construction);
Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 89-96; Bernard Williams, Auto-da-F , N. Y. REV.
OF BOOKS (Apr. 28, 1983) (reviewing RICHARD M. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS 1972-1980) (1982)).
8. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 10-22, 26-33.
9. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii-xiii.
10. See generally JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 156-57 (Beacon
Press definitive ed. 1957) (1920) ("The hypothesis that works is the true one .... ").
Dewey also writes: "[T]he interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some
adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category.
Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin .... " Id. at 87. For a
more contemporary statement, see generally 3 RICHARD RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons:
Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: TRUTH AND
PROGRESS 153 (1998) [hereinafter RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons]; RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) [hereinafter RORTY, MIRROR].
[Vol. 119:1
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theory is a reduction of truth to what the relevant community accepts in
its constitutional practice." According to this theory, propositions of
constitutional law are not made true by a correspondence with something
in the world, such as the objective Constitution. Instead, they are made
true by the community accepting and endorsing them in its constitutional
practice.12 Although this approach draws upon, and derives from, an
important thread in modem philosophy, it has been little employed in
American constitutional interpretation and, despite the claims Bobbitt
makes, remains at best controversial. 
13
The importance of this foundational, representational theory in
constitutional theory is unsurprising. The history of Western philosophy
is to a very large degree the story of the many efforts undertaken by
philosophers to construct or otherwise establish foundations.
Foundations have been offered for knowledge, faith, mathematics, the
external world, our moral intuitions, language, other minds, reference,
and the reliability of our sensory experience. 14 Another important strand
11. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]; BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2; DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH].
To the extent that Bobbitt's account devalues the concept of truth, it is somewhat
misleading to focus on Bobbitt's account of truth in explaining his theory. Nevertheless,
that focus allows the contrast with the theory underlying the originalism debate to be
highlighted more clearly.
12. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 169 ("[Tlhe truth of our statements is not
the result of the relationship between our linguistic acts and some state of affairs.");
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii.
13. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 194 n.4 (citing only two works,
both co-authored by his colleague Sanford Levinson, for this bold claim). Moreover,
those adopting elements of Bobbitt's theory do not always seem to recognize the violence
that they are doing to Bobbitt's more fundamental claims when they borrow from that
theory. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 1, at 4 n.2 (purporting to borrow from Bobbitt's
theory but claiming that the original understanding of the Constitution trumps competing
modes of argument when that understanding is known). The past couple of decades have
not seen Bobbitt's anti-foundational theory any more widely accepted. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS
IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 72-73 (2005)
(arguing that how well a constitutional interpretation or decision works must be the sole
test of correctness); Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 87-89, 89 ("This auto-da-ft of
truth has compromised public and political as well as academic discussion."). But see
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 128-29 (seemingly concluding that Bobbitt's
theory had not triumphed by 1998 when Patterson was writing: "[d]espite its aspirations,
contemporary legal theory has yet to free itself from the scientific pretensions of the
nineteenth century").
14. Descartes began the project of finding the foundations of our knowledge. The
effort to prove our faith was a dominant theme among the scholastics, and the proofs of
St. Anselm and St. Thomas are among the most celebrated. See generally SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS, Summa Theologica Art. III, in INTRODUCTION TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
(Anton C. Pegis ed., 1948). The proof of the existence of the external world and the
refutation of solipsism also commanded the attention of Descartes, for example, as he
2014]
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of that tradition, however, has been an effort to deny the need for
foundations as demanded by Plato, Descartes, and others in the
mainstream of our philosophical tradition or to dissolve classical
philosophical problems as arising from confusion.15 The strategy to deny
the foundationalist project has two principal components but numerous
varieties. First, an array of contemporary philosophers has attacked the
notion that our language is founded on a pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual
external world.16 Addressing the Kantian challenge of how our concepts
and experiences relate, such anti-foundationalists deny that the external
world is the touchstone against which our concepts, language, and
knowledge are to be tested. 7 Second, extending that line of attack, anti-
representationalists would go further to deny that our language and
concepts represent that external world.18  But each would deny that
struggled to rebut the possibility that the world was but an illusion created by an evil
genius; in modem philosophy the problem has been restated in secular terms as the
possibility that we are merely a brain in a vat. See, e.g., RENA DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS
ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 131 (Elizabeth S.
Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 1911) (1641); Hilary Putnam, Brains in a Vat, in REASON,
TRUTH AND HISTORY 1 (1981). Modem philosophers from Frege and Russell to Kripke
and Donnellan have explored the theory of reference. See, e.g., GOTTLOB FREGE, THE
BASIC LAWS OF ARITHMETIC (Montgomery Furth trans., 1967) (1893); SAUL KRIPKE,
NAMING AND NECESSITY (1982) [hereinafter SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING]; Keith Donnellan,
Reference and Definite Descriptions, 75 PHIL. REV. 281 (1966); SCOTT SOAMES, BEYOND
RIGIDITY: THE UNFINISHED SEMANTIC AGENDA OF NAMING AND NECESSITY (2002)
[hereinafter SOAMES, RIGIDITY]. For a classic account of this strand of modem analytic
philosophy, see 2 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2003). The reliability of our sense experience is grounded in theorists from the classical
British empiricists to the modem Logical Empiricists who attempt to derive all language
from such sense data. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Dover Publ'ns 1836) (1690); A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC
(Penguin Group 1971) (1936).
15. Contemporary examples include the later Wittgenstein in his assault on
foundational accounts of language and Richard Rorty in his assault on traditional
accounts of epistemology and the classical problems of philosophy. Earlier examples
include the logical positivist effort to reduce classical philosophical problems to
pseudoproblems and the pragmatists.
16. See, e.g., Huw PRICE, One Cheer for Representationalism?, in NATURALISM
WITHOUT MIRRORS 304, 306 (2011) (purporting to defend a middle ground anti-
representational theory between Rorty's global anti-representational theory and
Brandom's modest representational commitments); DONALD DAVIDSON, Meaning, Truth,
and Evidence, in TRUTH, LANGUAGE, AND HISTORY 47 (2005) [hereinafter DAVIDSON,
Meaning and Evidence].
17. Thus, for example, Donald Davidson writes: [e]mpiricism ... I take to involve
not only the pallid claim that all knowledge of the world comes through the agency of the
senses, but also the conviction that this fact is of prime epistemological significance."
DAVIDSON, Meaning and Evidence, supra note 16, at 48. Davidson notes that "it is ... an
idea which, for all its attractions, I think Quine should abandon." Id. at 47; see also
RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons, supra note 10, at 153-63.
18. See generally Richard M. Rorty, The World Well Lost, 69 J. PHIL. 649 (1972),
reprinted in THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 3 (1982) [hereinafter Rorty, World]
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foundations are needed for our language and knowledge. Critics of
originalism, radical and otherwise, as well as critics of the entire debate
have invoked and built upon this latter tradition. I will defend two
claims in this Article: that the anti-representational account of
constitutional propositions is more plausible than the traditional,
representational account and that the rejection of the representational
theory tacitly shared by the protagonists in the debate over originalism
causes that debate to collapse. Without those philosophical foundations,
the disagreements central to the main elements of the debate over
originalism are no longer important. Although not technically
meaningless, the disagreements are not meaningful in any important
way.
Second, I will explore some of the criticisms that may be made of
the anti-foundational position and then defend those claims against such
criticisms. Within the jurisprudential community, the realist criticism of
the anti-foundational claims has been most fully articulated by Dworkin
and, to a much lesser degree, Brian Leiter. 19 That realist criticism will be
the focus here, both with respect to the challenges leveled against the
anti-foundational stance and for the defense of such a position. But the
anti-representational account of language has also been controversial in
the philosophy of language, and a brief review of the arguments made
there can sharpen my focus in this Article.
Third, I examine the force of the anti-foundationalist position as a
challenge both to originalism and to originalism's mainstream critics. As
the anti-foundational critics have expressly argued, when the debate over
(presenting an early statement of the claim that our linguistic claims are not accountable
to the world in a philosophically important way). These challenges have, to a greater or
lesser degree, been associated with Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, McDowell, Putnam,
Brandom, and Rorty. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1953); WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE,
WORD AND OBJECT (1st MIT Press paperback ed. 1964); W.V. Quine, Main Trends in
Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951), reprinted in
FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (1953); DAVIDSON, Meaning and Evidence, supra
note 16; JOHN McDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (1st Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed.
1996); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE (James Conant ed., 1990)
[hereinafter PUTNAM, REALISM]; RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10; ROBERT B. BRANDOM,
Pragmatism, Expressivism and Anti-Representationalism: Local and Global Possibilities,
in PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY 190 (2011)
[hereinafter Brandom, Anti-Representationalism]. Each would differ very significantly
with the others on key points. Thus, for example, the later Wittgenstein focused his
criticism on the representational account of language that had held him captive in his
earlier Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, while Quine attacked more traditional empirical
models of language with his assault on the concept of the analytic-synthetic distinction
and on empiricist models of language.
19. See generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2; BRIAN LEITER, Why Quine Is
Not a Postmodernist, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 137 (2007) [hereinafter LEITER, Quine].
2014]
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originalism is stripped of appeals to an objective, ontologically
independent Constitution and a representational account of propositions
of constitutional law, and the theory of truth associated therewith, the
debate collapses, without victory for either side. The stance defended
here is equally antithetical to both sides of the originalism debate.2 °
Fourth, and finally, I present the arguments that may be made
against the claim that the anti-representational, anti-foundational account
undermines the premises of the debate about originalism and the
respective opposing positions and offer response to those arguments.
Some protagonists dispute the premises of the anti-representational
theory; others argue that the claims do not undermine the debate in the
way Bobbitt claims, and I defend here.
I. AGAINST FOUNDATIONALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Anti-foundational, anti-representational accounts of language and
the world are complex and controversial.21  In introducing these
arguments here, my goal is not to join into that sophisticated,
professional, abstruse, and sometimes arcane philosophical debate.
Rather, I want introduce the arguments before exploring how those
arguments have been employed in constitutional law. Because anti-
representationalism may be novel and counterintuitive, however, I
defend it against some of the more apparent objections.
A. The Anti-Foundationalist Account
A series of expressly anti-foundational, anti-representational
thinkers have developed a radical perspective on constitutional law and
the originalism debate. Although the focus here is principally on Philip
Bobbitt,22 Dennis Patterson23 has endorsed and developed Bobbitt's
20. It is important to note the very limited use made of philosophy in this analysis.
Its role is therapeutic, highlighting tacit confusions in the underlying constitutional
arguments. For a fuller defense of this limited role, see generallyLeDuc, Relationship,
supra note 2 (defending a limited, therapeutic role for philosophy in constitutional law
against the claims of irrelevance by Justice Scalia and Robert Bork, on the one hand, and
the claim to a foundational role by Ronald Dworkin).
21. See generally PRICE, supra note 16, at 304; Brandom, Anti-Representationalism,
supra note 18; RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10. For a representative robust criticism of
Rorty's anti-representational attack on the importance of truth, see Dworkin, Objectivity,
supra note 2, at 92-93; GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 10-14.
22. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2.
23. See generally PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11.
[Vol. 119:1
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views and Dennis Goldford has advanced parallel arguments.24 All three
theorists attribute a common error to the originalists and their critics.
25
They do not offer support for either side in the debate, instead offering
the potential to transcend the debate in its entirety by reforming its
premises. Bobbitt and Patterson adopt a Wittgensteinian, Rortian
approach.26 They argue that we can best understand constitutional law
without an appeal to the foundations of that law or a representational
theory of the truth and meaning of that law.
It is often unclear, however, how Bobbitt's various claims relate to
each other.27 I will articulate his claims more precisely and explain the
relationships among the various claims he makes. I will restate and
defend the principal claims that Bobbitt makes about truth, knowledge,
and the ontological status of the Constitution corresponding to the claims
made by the originalists and Dworkin. Lastly I will explore and evaluate
Bobbitt's controversial claim that the originalism debate and the debate
over judicial review is grounded on mistaken, shared philosophical
premises among the protagonists.28
According to the anti-foundational and anti-representational account
of constitutional law, originalism and its critics commit errors of theory:
truth theory, theory of language, ontology, and jurisprudence.
Additionally, originalists err in their semantic description of
constitutional controversies. First, ontologically, the anti-
foundationalists claim that constitutional law does not have an existence
outside of, or independent of, our practices. Instead, those practices
24. See generally GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 1. Goldford seeks to dissolve the
debate over originalism by finding an ongoing political constitutive role in our
constitutional discourse. This may appear very different from Bobbitt's position because
Bobbitt denies a political characterization of constitutional law. However, I think that
while Goldford is less sensitive to the nature of constitutional argument than Bobbitt,
Goldford's account of what goes on in constitutional discourse is not as different as its
terminology might suggest.
25. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n. 1; PATTERSON, TRUTH,
supra note 11, at 166 n.60; GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 1, at 265 n.5 (invoking Kant
and Hegel to support the claim that our account of the Constitution must capture its
constitutive and binding character).
26. See BoBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n. 1; PATTERSON, TRUTH,
supra note 11, at 166 n.60. See GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 1, at 265 n.5. Goldford
is avowedly Hegelian; this contrast with Bobbitt and Patterson is less stark than might
appear, but exploring those themes would take us too far afield. Goldford's Hegelianism
comes into play in his effort to effect a synthesis from the debate over originalism, rather
than to resolve it on its own terms. See GOLDFORD, DEBATE, supra note 1, at x
(suggesting that in light of the unproductiveness of the originalism debate, "we should
take an analytical step back and explore whether such an opposition actually stems from a
shared structure of premises"). That strategy is shared with Bobbitt and Patterson.
27. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 196-219.
28. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii; see also quotation infra at
note 389.
20141
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constitute the American Constitution and American constitutional law.
They are the reasoned, argumentative activity or practice in which we
engage.
This ontological claim has an important consequence for the nature
of truth for propositions of constitutional law. The truth of propositions
of law cannot arise from the correspondence of those propositions with
that-thing-called-constitutional-law-in-the-world. In the absence of a
thing-that-is-law-in-the-world, there can be nothing for such propositions
to correspond to. For anti-foundationalists like Bobbitt, truth, if a useful
notion at all, turns on how our practice of law treats such constitutional
or legal claims. To the extent that propositions of law are affirmed by
the relevant constitutional community, they are true. The meaning of
propositions of constitutional law is determined on a coherence theory of
truth or by reference to the premises that support such propositions and
the truth of the implications that follow from them.
Finally, the semantic account of constitutional controversies would
also be denied in my argument.29 Constitutional argument consists of six
modes of argument, none of which can invariably trump any of the
others, but each of which can sometimes itself trump all of the other
modes. Bobbitt asserts that his catalogue of the modes of constitutional
argument is a complete description of the permissible forms of
constitutional argument. He notes that appeals to kinship, for example,
are simply not made as a matter of constitutional law and would be
summarily rejected if they were.30
Bobbitt claims to have captured the entire array of available modes
of argument. Missing modes might appear to include moral arguments
or arguments from the nature of democracy, emphasizing the will of the
people. Neither form of argument would appear easily assimilated to the
modes that Bobbitt identifies. 31 A moral argument might be an argument
based upon the kinds of considerations that Dworkin asserts ought to be
29. For the classic statement of the claim that certain jurisprudential theories are
committed to the claim that legal and constitutional disputes about semantic meaning, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 31-44 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]. While
many disagreements turn on the meaning to be ascribed to words and sentences, it is
perhaps less clear that theories would reduce the dispute to a matter of semantics. As I
use the term, I mean simply to deny that any such reduction is possible.
30. See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6.
31. Bobbitt would clearly treat Ely's argument to read the Constitution with an
overall emphasis on improving democracy as a structural argument. For the clearest
statement of such an argument, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74-77 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY] (identifying
arguments and interpretations that protect the representation of minorities and generally
render the democratic process more transparent and responsive as central to the mission
of the Court in interpreting the Constitution).
[Vol. 119:1
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taken into account in the most fundamental cases.32 It, too, would not
appear to fit into one of Bobbitt's modes. The completeness of Bobbitt's
analysis requires that such arguments be excluded. 3
If non-canonical arguments may be introduced, then Bobbitt's claim
that his catalog of modes of argument legitimates the decisions and
outcomes pursuant to those modes of argument would appear
compromised. An incomplete list would not be sufficient to permit us to
reject results derived from a non-canonical argument as illegitimate.
Only if there were a further practice for adding or subtracting arguments
could Bobbitt's argument hold.34 On the other hand, if Bobbitt has
simply missed modes that exist in our contemporary constitutional
practice, then the omission would appear less problematic.
It is perhaps helpful to summarize the affirmative anti-
foundationalist views with respect to four central philosophical issues:
1. Constitutional law is not an independent ontological entity,
but is instead an ordered, evolving set of social practices
composed of arguments and agreements.
2. The truth of propositions of constitutional law is given by
the coherence of such propositions with our other beliefs
and commitments. Propositions of constitutional law do
not have truth conditions and are not rendered true by their
correspondence with facts about the world. How useful the
concept of truth is in this context is an open question.
3. The meaning of propositions of constitutional law is given
by the premises and inferences that support them and the
implications that flow from them, not from the picture of
the world such propositions offer.
4. Constitutional disagreements are disagreements employing
one or more of the six modes of argument to different and
conflicting results. There is no metric or algorithm that
resolves the conflict between the modes of argument when
32. See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29, at 380.
33. As Bobbitt occasionally puts it and Balkin and Levinson emphasize, Bobbitt
purports to offer a grammar of constitutional argument. Thus, Bobbitt purports to be able
to test the legitimacy of constitutional arguments in much the same way that a tacit or
express knowledge of a language's grammar permits the evaluation of utterances and
statements in a language as proper or ungrammatical. Such a grammar must offer a
classification of all principal grammatical forms of the relevant language in order to be
able to make such judgments possible. Otherwise uncatalogued modes of argument
could not be classified. See generally Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1771 (1994) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Grammar].
34. It is obviously more difficult to construct an account of constitutional practice
incorporating second-order practices of expanding the permissible modes of argument, if
only because of the "thinness" in any such second-order practice. Such activity would be
sufficiently uncommon that it might be difficult to identify as it as a practice.
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they support different outcomes, only the response or
consensus of constitutional judges, commentators, and
other informed members of the constitutional interpretative
community.
Not all of the positions summarized above are of equal import. In
particular, Bobbitt is little-perhaps, as I shall endeavor to show, too
little-concerned with a theory of meaning. But his ontological claims,
his account of the truth of propositions of constitutional law, and his
account of constitutional disagreement and argument are central to his
constitutional theory.
1. The Ontology of the Constitution
Bobbitt would reduce constitutional law to our practices of
constitutional argument, debate, and adjudication. As he puts it,
constitutional law is something we do, not something that exists
independent of that activity.35  Moreover, such practices are not
representational. They do not seek to represent a constitutional law that
exists independently in the external world. There can be no account of
the truth of propositions of constitutional law that relies upon the
correspondence of such propositions with our Constitution-in-the-world,
because there is no such thing for which correspondence may be found.36
35. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 24.
36. It is helpful to place Bobbitt's claims in context. Although Bobbitt does not
generally attempt to contextualize his constitutional theory, it falls within the mainstream
of American legal pragmatism. American legal pragmatism generally extended the non-
foundationalist theories of knowledge and truth to law. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (highlighting the limited role of
philosophy and logic in the interpretation of law and the decision of cases). Bobbitt is
within that tradition with his attempt to derive constitutional theory from constitutional
practice. See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1869,
1872-73 (1994) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Reflections]. Bobbitt explains Constitutional Fate:
"Thus, Constitutional Fate asks, 'What legitimates judicial review?' and proposes an
antifoundationalist answer. That is, I located legitimation in a particular practice, rather
than in a prior, external rationale." Id. at 1872 (footnote omitted). Moreover, to the
extent that Bobbitt's six modes of constitutional decision making echo similar factors
articulated by Judge Cardozo, the doctrinal continuity is highlighted. See generally
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
111 (1992) (identifying five types of arguments distinguished by Justice Cardozo in
constitutional adjudication including those based on: (1) text; (2) intent of the Framers;
(3) structure and purpose; (4) precedent; and (5) principles of political morality or social
policy). What Bobbitt adds as a fundamental and original element in this account is an
explanation for why the disparate modes of argument exist together, why they cannot be
ordered or harmonized, and why there cannot be a metamode to reconcile them. That is
an element in the theory missing from the original Cardozian description and, indeed, one




Bobbitt's project to find the Constitution in the practices of the
courts and the constitutional law commentariat may appear
counterintuitive, perhaps even bizarre. Any defense of Bobbitt's position
must begin with an acknowledgment of its fundamental conflict with our
ordinary intuitions about the nature of the Constitution and our ordinary
ways of speaking about the Constitution.37 We think that there is a
Constitution that has an independent existence, and we think and talk as
if there are truth conditions for statements we make about what the
Constitution says and means.38 We think constitutional disagreements
are about just that-what the Constitution says and means. The
originalism debate, in particular, is largely conducted in these terms.39 In
the face of the existing robust debate over originalism, Bobbitt has to
explain what that conversation has been, what the protagonists have been
asserting, and what they have been disagreeing about, on his
counterintuitive anti-foundational account.
First, how can a practice-what judges do--constitute the
Constitution? Bobbitt believes that it is the practice itself that constitutes
the legitimacy; there is nothing more-no principle, no argument, no
text-that provides further legitimacy. If our established practice derives
a result, that result is legitimate. Bobbitt's claim to establish the
legitimacy of the practice of judicial review by that practice, and the
associated arguments, relies in part on a distinction he emphasizes
between legitimacy and justice.40  Legitimacy is the legal feature that
marks an argument or a decision as falling within our constitutional law
practice; it reflects an internal point of view. There is often manifestly
no single legitimate argument or decision; any such claim follows from
the different modes of constitutional argument.4' Justice, by contrast, is
a moral attribute. Bobbitt defines an outcome as just if it may be derived
from "the most satisfactory moral theory.42 Thus, Bobbitt very clearly
37. In ordinary discourse, after all, speakers appear to talk about the Constitution as
if it were a thing, not unlike other discrete things-and unlike other abstractions like truth
and justice, for example. Bobbitt appears to deny that this is proper.
38. In fairness, following Wittgenstein the question might be posed as to what it
would be like if we spoke as if there were no ontologically independent Constitution.
39. See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, upra note 1.
40. See generally Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1870. For example, for
Bobbitt, Nazi law would have counted as legitimate but not as just. See BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 27-28 ("This is a solution, however, that many will
find unsatisfying. It separates legitimation from justification and thus, for those who
hunger for a justification of judicial review, this solution famisheth even as it is
consumed.").
41. Bobbitt asserts that it follows from the requirement that each of the modes be
comprehensive that each must also be indeterminate. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2, at 31. He doesn't explain this claim, however, and it is hardly obvious.
42. Id. at 143.
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separates the moral realm from the legal realm, following legal
positivism.43  Bobbitt claims only to establish legitimacy; he
acknowledges that demonstrating the justice of an outcome or decision
requires a different argument.44 Bobbitt's claim to have established the
legitimacy of judicial review is an argument that the search for
controlling, decisive text or understanding, beyond either the
Constitution or the practice ofjudicial review, is misguided and fruitless.
Although Bobbitt does not situate his theory in the debate over legal
positivism, it is helpful to explore the theory using the metrics of that
debate. His theory is not a legal positivist theory in the traditional
sense.45 Bobbitt's theory would not appear to permit the derivation of
legal principles and rules from social practices. According to Bobbitt,
the indeterminacy of constitutional duties and obligations is inherent in
our constitutional law.46 Nevertheless, it is precisely the social practices
of making and accepting or rejecting constitutional arguments in
Bobbitt's canonical six modes that ultimately determines our
constitutional law.
If Bobbitt's theory is a positivist theory, it is so for two principal
reasons. First, Bobbitt's theory is a positivist account because Bobbitt
constitutes constitutional law as a matter of social practices and those
social practices are, in the lexicon of legal positivism, social facts.
Second, Bobbitt's claim to distinguish his permitted mode of
constitutional argument he terms ethical argument from moral argument
must be accepted. Otherwise the positivist claim to separate legal
obligations from moral obligations would not be satisfied.47 But
Bobbitt's theory, with its assertion that the multiple modes of
constitutional argument result in some measure of indeterminacy in our
constitutional law, would fail to satisfy Hart's requirement that there be a
rule of recognition in a legal system.a Such a failure to provide a rule of
43. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 151-52 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN,
PRINCIPLE] (providing a sophisticated analysis of the positivist separation of law and
morality).
44. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xvi.
45. See JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 37, 37 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the moral thesis of legal positivism as asserting
that moral value is only a contingent feature of law); COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 43,
at 75 (characterizing the social fact thesis, which holds that the content of law is a matter
of social fact, as central to legal positivism); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed.
2012) (introducing the concept of law as a union of primary and secondary rules and
emphasizing the elements of shared practice and an internal point of view toward the
legal rules for a law-bound community).
46. See generally BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 31-47.
47. See COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 43, at 94-95.
48. HART, supra note 4545, at 94-95.
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recognition would need to be deemed insufficient to disqualify Bobbitt's
account as a legal positivist account. Nevertheless, Bobbitt's
constitutional theory ought not to be construed as a legal positivist theory
because although Bobbitt denies moral theory a role in constitutional
argument and thus in deciding constitutional decision, his concept of
ethical argument is a normative concept. As such, it introduces
normative sources into constitutional law, on Bobbitt's account. Those
normative sources are incompatible with a positivist account.
The form in which Bobbitt chose to present his argument has
doubtless contributed to the confusion that has greeted it and may
continue to surround it. In his preface to Constitutional Fate Bobbitt
wrote: "This book presents a general theory of Constitutional decision.
It is not written in a conventionally theoretical manner. The way in
which this theory is presented is naturally determined by some of the
assumptions of the theory itself and, like it, differs from the standard
models in this subject.'' 49 A reader may easily be puzzled by this preface
and remain puzzled even after completing the work. I take Bobbitt to be
alluding to his view that constitutional law is a practice. Constitutional
Fate is his effort to introduce the reader to that practice rather than to
present accurate representations of the world of constitutional law. The
difficulty in Bobbitt's style emerged over time. In the preface to
Constitutional Interpretation, written nearly a decade later, Bobbitt
acknowledged:
I came to realize that I had, to some extent, perhaps incited the very
errors that so grated on me, for in my description of the six modalities
of argument as legitimating I had not addressed the issue of what to
do if the forms disagreed, e.g., if textual argument led to one
conclusion and historical argument to another. 50
Careful reading of Bobbitt's account raises a number of
fundamental questions. When he catalogs the modes of constitutional
argument, Bobbitt appears to imply that they are coequal.51 But when he
describes the modes and their history, not only does an apparent
49. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at ix (emphasis added).
50. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi. In describing the style of
Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt acknowledges that Powell identifies a key part of Bobbitt's
argument as unstated. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1880 (because that claim
can only be shown, not stated, on Bobbitt's view). A good example of the problems
arising from Bobbitt's style is Pat Gudridge's savage review in the Ha rvard Law Review.
See Patrick 0. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1969, 1972 (1983) ("Constitutional Fate discourages close study. The difficulty lies, in
several respects, in the author's manner of presentation."). In fact, Constitutional Fate
requires and rewards close study-in part because of the style Bobbitt employs.
51. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi (describing Constitutional
Fate's failure to explain how conflicting modes of argument were to be reconciled).
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hierarchy emerge, but the very nature of certain modes is called into
question. Textual argument52 is the most questionable mode.3 Bobbitt
never explains why the original semantic understanding of a provision
should be a reason for interpreting or applying it in the same way today.
Bobbitt might simply assert that the legitimacy of such a reason is
inherent in the accepted status of such an argument as a permissible form
of argument and that his theory does not require that he explain why a
mode is accepted. In his theory, there can be no legitimation beyond the
accepted practice.54 It is no more sensible to ask why the original
understanding is important than it is to ask whether the prudence of a
position is relevant or whether the consistency of an interpretation with
the constitutional structure matters. That appears paradoxical because
the prudential argument carries its decisional implication on its face. But
within our practice of constitutional argument, all of the forms carry such
an implication.
Bobbitt's claims that the modalities of the Constitution are
incommensurable and cannot be reconciled by a decisional algorithm or
principle and that those modes of argument, without more, constitute and
legitimate our constitutional doctrine, have proven highly controversial.55
Bobbitt's claim of the indeterminacy of the modes of argument has been
questioned.56 Critics have defended purported derivations of a trumping
mode. Most recently, Jack Balkin has elevated textual and historical
modes of argument in Living Originalism.57 While Balkin follows other
originalists in allowing a place for constitutional construction58 and, as a
non-exclusive originalist, allows other modes a place in interpretation
when the original understanding is uncertain or unclear,59 Balkin
nevertheless privileges original understandings in constitutional
interpretation. 60
52. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 7.
53. Id. at 25-38.
54. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii-xiii.
55. See, e.g., id.; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 125 (describing the prevailing
view that ethical argument was "disreputable"). Bobbitt's characterization of the
prevailing view of ethical argument ought to be understood as that such argument is not
properly part of constitutional argument.
56. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1794.
57. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 17-20.
58. See id. at 4-6, 341-42 n.2 (arguing that where the text of the Constitution is
indeterminate, Bobbitt's modes of argument must be employed to construe the
constitutional meaning).
59. See id. at 14-16. For a discussion of the contrast between exclusive and non-
exclusive originalism, see generally Andr& LeDuc, Evolving Oiginalism: How Are the
Original Understandings, Expectations and Intentions Privileged (Jan. 1.2, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
60. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 14-16.
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Some have also simply denied Bobbitt's reduction of our
constitutional law to our practice of constitutional argument.61 They
claim an ontological status of the Constitution as an independent thing.
On this account, the Constitution is whatever it may noumenally be,
regardless of our understandings of it or arguments about it. 62  The
argument against Bobbitt's reductionism may proceed at an intuitive,
anti-skeptical level. Bobbitt's denial of the Constitution on this approach
may be refuted by simply pointing to the constitutional artifact in the
National Archives, much like Samuel Johnson's refutation of Berkeley.63
Bobbitt's claim may also be challenged on the more conceptual basis that
Bobbitt's ability to reduce the Constitution to the practice of
constitutional argument requires defining the limits of that practice with
some precision. If no such convention or accepted practice of making
and accepting constitutional arguments exists, then the definitional
strategy fails and the reduction dissolves. Some critics have denied
Bobbitt's definitional claims with respect to the practice of constitutional
argument. 64
The indeterminacy of the modes of argument appears critical to
Bobbitt's own account of his theory, but it is surely one of the most
difficult features of that theory. Bobbitt even purports to offer a modal
logic proof for his claims with respect to the necessary indeterminacy of
his forms of argument.65 According to that proof, taking the Dred Scott
case as a hypothetical, Bobbitt argues that a possible worlds, metalogical
analysis of the implications of the inconsistent constitutional principles-
some supporting the outcome in Dred Scott and some supporting the
contrary outcome-shows that there cannot be a decisional rule-a
metalogic in Bobbitt's terms66-that yields the decision.67 One imagines
most readers of Constitutional Interpretation puzzling over this
61. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 163 (1989) (acknowledging that we may not always be able to
discover the original understanding and force of the Constitution, but defending the claim
that we will often be able to discover such meaning).
62. Id.
63. See generally H.F. Hallett, Dr. Johnson's Refutation of Bishop Berkeley, 56
MIND 132 (1947).
64. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1802-03.
65. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 160-62. Bobbitt characterizes his
logic proof as "rudimentary." Id. at 160. Bobbitt borrows important elements from this
example from Alvin Plantinga. See id. at 222 n.26 (citing ALVIN PLANT1NGA, THE
NATURE OF NECESSITY 164-84 (1974) (offering a proof of free will's compatibility with
the existence of an omnipotent god)).
66. Here Bobbitt relies upon Hunter's definition. See GEOFFREY HUNTER,
METALOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE METATHEORY OF STANDARD FIRST ORDER LOGIC 3
(1973). Elsewhere Bobbitt makes it clear that he is using the term in a non-technical (and
idiosyncratic) sense. BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 216 n.8.
67. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 161.
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purported logical argument for Bobbitt's claims.68 It is a dramatic
claim-a proof of Bobbitt's constitutional theory and a proof of the
existence of free will.
Bobbitt's claim that our practice of constitutional argument
constitutes the Constitution raises the question of the independence of the
Constitution, so understood, from our other social practices. Bobbitt
argues that our constitutional practice is independent; that is why it is
possible to enumerate the permitted modes of constitutional argument
and exclude other modes of argument employed in other contexts. Yet it
would hardly appear that constitutional law, even if autonomous, is an
independent domain entirely divorced from our other social practices.
Unfortunately, Bobbitt is never very clear about how the line between
permissible constitutional argument and other kinds of argument is to be
drawn, nor is he clear about how the participants in the constitutional
process learn and apply that line.
Bobbitt's game metaphors sometimes suggest a high degree of
independence. The game of chess, for example, can be played almost
entirely without reference to other social practices.69 Yet that analogy
appears rather unsatisfactory precisely because of the very different
performative roles of chess and constitutional argument.7 ° Chess is
merely a game, generally a matter only of our amusement. The stakes in
constitutional argument are much higher, and its role in our life, even for
grand masters, is far more central and more critical. After all, the
Constitution defines the limits of our personal and economic freedoms
and the limits on our state and federal governments. It is therefore
unlikely that constitutional argument could perform such a mission
without being deeply embedded in our social and political lives. As part
of being so embedded, constitutional practices would need to be more
closely interwoven with our other practices in those realms. Bobbitt
recognizes this when he notes that we could have different modes of
68. His arguments invoke unstated claims of decidability, consistency, and
completeness that are never expressly articulated and which cannot be accessible to his
general audience. Space does not permit exploring this argument here.
69. We perhaps need conventions with respect to measuring time to ensure a pace of
play, number, to count moves, and a normal environment to rule out improper
distractions, but seemingly little else.
70. In constitutional practice, moreover, the moves have conceptual content; they
figure in our inferences as premises and as conclusions, as the moves in chess do not. As
a result, the structure of such moves is very different, and the relationship that the
practice of constitutional law has with the rest of our lives, beliefs, and practices is very
different, too. See generally ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 165-66 (2000) [hereinafter BRANDOM, ARTICULATING




constitutional argument but that then "we would be different., 71 What
Bobbitt means by this claim that we would be different is that our society
and our political system and life would have different values and
practices.72  Balkin and Levinson highlight this tension between
description and prescription and criticize Bobbitt for his failure to
distinguish the two in his account of constitutional law. 7
Bobbitt's invocation of the distinction between constitutional
practice and other social practices raises the question of the degree of
precision that he must achieve in drawing that line. That question arises
because it appears unlikely that such a law could be drawn very
precisely. One possible strategy to articulate the distinction between the
two kinds of practices would be to introduce Kuhnian concepts of normal
science and revolutionary science into Bobbitt's account of our
constitutional practice.74 Bobbitt may be describing our current normal
constitutional practice. If Bobbitt is so interpreted, then constitutional
change and the incorporation of practices or arguments outside our
normal constitutional practice could be explained as revolutionary
practice.75 Two potential objections are apparent. First, how plausible is
it that such porousness in the boundary between our constitutional
practice and our other social and political practices appears only in
paradigm shifting revolution? If we interpret the concept of revolution
broadly, there is some intuitive appeal in a distinction between normal
and extraordinary forms of constitutional argument. Would Bobbitt be
prepared to recognize such a distinction, and, if so, what would examples
of revolutionary constitutional argument be?
71. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6.
72. Bobbitt's reference, without citation, to Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four captures
this nicely. Id. Orwell describes a society that purports to respect and honor individual
freedom while ruthlessly eliminating any elements of individual freedom, autonomy and
dignity. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). The critical
contrast is between what is said and what is in fact practiced.
73. See Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1782-84 (arguing that
Bobbitt conflates description with prescription in his account of constitutional law).
74. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970) (1962) [hereinafter KUHN, REVOLUTIONS]. Somewhat simplistically, normal
science is the practice within a scientific community when shared theoretical
commitments yield an accepted research agenda; revolutionary science occurs when the
accepted scientific theories no longer provide a compelling explanation of the results of
contemporaneous experiment. See generally id.
75. Such an approach recognizing the notion of revolutionary constitutional practice
would appear similar to Bruce Ackerman's re-description of the discontinuities in
constitutional interpretation and practice that he would characterize as tacit constitutional
amendments. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 49 (1993)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE] (introducing the claim that the Constitution has
been transformed on occasion without formal constitutional amendment).
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Second, and more fundamentally, is the underlying distinction
between normal and revolutionary constitutional practice tenable?76 If
the normal argument cannot be distinguished from the revolutionary
argument in constitutional practice, then the project of identifying normal
modes of constitutional argument would appear infelicitous and the
distinction empty. Each novel form of argument could be reconciled
with Bobbitt's account by characterizing the new form of argument as
revolutionary.77 Bobbitt's concept of normal constitutional argument
thus becomes important in his theoretical account of constitutional
practice.
Bobbitt's normative claims as to the permissible appear to warrant
additional defense. At an intuitive level, Bobbitt captures the notion that
certain arguments, indeed, certain types or modes of argument, like an
argument from nepotism, are impermissible.7' But those are easy cases.
The most plausible form of constitutional argument that Bobbitt needs to
dispatch is moral argument. He has acknowledged as much and offers an
argument against moral argument as an accepted form of constitutional
argument.79  First, Bobbitt offers an empirical argument: moral
arguments are not found in constitutional briefs or in constitutional
opinions.8° Second, and less clearly articulated, Bobbitt appears to
suggest that the nature of moral arguments is different from the kinds of
argument that are permissible in constitutional adjudication.81 This claim
is not expressly articulated or defended, but it goes to the heart of the
questions commentators have raised as to the tacit normativity of
Bobbitt's typology.8 2 Bobbitt does not think moral argument belongs in
our constitutional practice. He does not want that type of argument
included within the identified modalities of constitutional argument for
one clear and one possible reason. The certain reason is that Bobbitt
wants our constitutional practice to be largely independent. If moral
arguments were permitted, then the independence of constitutional
76. A similar challenge has been made to Kuhn's account of science, as Kuhn
acknowledged. See KUHN, REVOLUTIONS, supra note 74, at 174-81, 198-207. Indeed,
Kuhn apparently qualified his commitment to this distinction. See id.
77. Thus, it would appear necessary to describe a normal constitutional practice that
is not wholly static, permitting change and the introduction of new forms of argument.
78. See BOBBITT, FATE supra note 11, at 6.
79. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1916.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1917 (noting that the introduction of natural law arguments would be
"troubling," apparently because the introduction or acceptance of such argument would
compromise the independence of our constitutional practices and leave that practice
reliant upon, and perhaps derivative of, our practice of morality and moral argument).
82. See Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1774-77.
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practice would be compromised.83 The second, possible reason is the
uncertainty associated with moral argument in a pluralist society. If
moral arguments support different conclusions, moral argument would
appear to have a more fundamental indeterminacy than the other forms
of argument. That indeterminacy might undermine the constraints
Bobbitt wants to describe in our constitutional practice.
2. How and Why to Account for the Truth of Propositions of
Constitutional Law
Bobbitt argues that law, like language, is a social practice.
84 Law
has no foundation in texts or other authorities outside that practice.
Thus, particular elements of practice within our constitutional law
practice-such as judicial review-cannot be grounded or legitimated
from outside our practice. As a corollary, Bobbitt argues that the truth of
propositions of constitutional law 5 does not arise from a correspondence
with an external world of constitutional law but rather in a coherence
within other constitutional law beliefs, as well as the willingness of the
constitutional law theorists and practitioners to accede to the proposition.
Bobbitt differs from most other critics of originalism's claims
because he offers no alternative representational account of the truth of
propositions of constitutional law.86 Indeed, he also expressly disavows
83. Bobbitt's rejection of moral argument may appear to be grounded on a tacit
commitment to legal positivism; he may appear to be defending the separation thesis.
But elsewhere, Bobbitt expressly rejects legal positivism. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 2, at xix-xx n.1 (quoted infra, note 92). The reasons behind Bobbitt's
rejection of moral argument as a permissible mode of constitutional argument are not
easily ascertainable from the text of Constitutional Fate.
84. That practice consists, principally, in the making, rebutting, accepting, and
rejecting of arguments in the courts. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6-8; BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix n. 1.
85. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n.1; BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 11, at 4-5. While Bobbitt certainly writes of the truth of propositions of
constitutional law, he has rejected traditional concepts of truth for such propositions.
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n. 1.
86. For example, Dworkin accounts for the truth value of a proposition of
constitutional law by looking to whether it corresponds to an interpretation of the
Constitution derived by the methods of integrity. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at
118. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1249 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Arduous]; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29, at 418-19 n.29. Bobbitt also differs from
most critics of originalism in that he does not seek to discredit the historical and textual
arguments privileged in originalism. While he is not alone, he is clearly in the minority
in such regard. All of the critics who would substitute another mode as the exclusively
legitimate form of argument must reject the historical and textual methods of originalism.
See, e.g., Dworkin, Arduous, supra (defending the use of moral and political theory in
achieving legal integrity); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29; Richard A. Posner, Bork
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the anti-originalist, representationalist accounts.8' According to Bobbitt,
propositions of constitutional law do not have non-trivial truth
conditions.88 This is a striking claim; it means that we cannot aspire to
identify objective conditions that, if satisfied, assure the truth of any
proposition of constitutional law. Instead, in Bobbitt's view, we merely
have social practices of endorsing and treating such propositions as true
merely by how they are accepted.
Patterson builds on Bobbitt's passing claims with a much more
formal and comprehensive analysis.8 9 While both Bobbitt and Patterson
draw heavily on Wittgenstein's analysis, Patterson expressly disavows
significant components of Bobbitt's theory and amplifies that analysis
with significant alternative theoretical foundations.90 Patterson takes
Bobbitt's claims and both contextualizes and extends them.91 Law and
Truth is an inquiry into how legal propositions are made true, and how
and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, Bork] (defending a
utilitarian approach to legal decision).
87. Bobbitt does not suggest that textual or historical modes of argument are
inappropriate. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 9-24 (explaining historical argument),
25-38 (explaining textual argument). He recognizes them as among the six modes of
legitimate constitutional argument. Id. To the extent such legitimacy is denied by critics
of weak or moderate originalism, Bobbitt stands with such originalists, not their critics.
Bobbitt's rejection of originalism is clearest in his analysis of the confirmation hearings
on Robert H. Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2, at 83-108. Bobbitt's argument as to why Judge Bork's originalist views
disqualified him from the Court is perhaps the most compelling indictment yet
articulated. Bobbitt argues that the exclusive claims for originalism and the associated
wholesale assault on the legitimacy of the Court and its constitutional jurisprudence
disqualified Bork to sit on that Court. Id. Thus, Bobbitt's argument proceeds, not on a
value-free basis, but by focusing on Bork's challenge to the legitimacy of the Court. Id.
at 107-08, 108 ("To [the campaign against the legitimacy of the means of reasoning of
the Warren Court, Bork], in part, . . . owed his public reputation, his nomination, and
ultimately his defeat."). It should therefore appeal to a broad range of citizens, without
requiring a commitment to the political values of Dworkin and Tribe, for example. The
argument stands without the need to construct a theory of the constitutional mainstream
and its radical outliers. See id. at 83-108.
88. BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n.1; see also Bobbitt,
Reflections, supra note 36, at 1873. Truth conditions, in the philosophy of language, are
identifiable or ascertainable conditions that make statements in a natural or artificial
language true or false as they apply. See also DwoRKiN, EMPIRE, supra note 29, at 418-
19 n.29 (describing accounts of law based upon the truth conditions of legal propositions
approvingly as "modem").
89. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 151-79.
90. In particular, Patterson invokes Quine's holism in his account of the truth and
meaning of legal propositions. See id. at 158-59, 172.
91. The context into which Patterson seeks to place Bobbitt is that of post-
modernism. I think this contextualization was likely a misstep, if only for presentational
reasons. "Postmodemism" is, in certain circles, fighting words. Bobbitt does not
generally find it necessary to put his position into context in the space of reasons.
Patterson seeks to extend Bobbitt's account of truth of propositions of constitutional law
into a general account of the truth of all propositions of law. See id. at 151-79.
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the leading theories of law accept legal propositions to be true.
According to Bobbitt, our practice of constitutional argument, rather than
representing the constitutional world correctly, establishes the truth of
constitutional propositions.92 Patterson's account is more complex.
Patterson offers a general theory of truth in law.93  In his view,
Bobbitt sketches an account of the particular types of argument
employed in constitutional disputes that legitimate propositions of
constitutional law and make them true. Patterson seeks both to extend
that account and to render it with a little more precision. On his theory,
the truth of legal propositions and the resolution of conflict among
otherwise accepted types of argument is not made by recourse to
conscience, but on a holistic basis.94 Here Patterson invokes philosopher
Willard Van Orman Quine's theory of scientific theory formation.95 The
resolution of such conflicts is not based upon an algorithm or rule, or
even a principle, other than overall fit, simplicity, etc., much in the same
way that we choose among competing theories.96
Three questions arise with respect to Patterson's theory and its
relationship to the account offered by Bobbitt. First, it is hard to imagine
that ethical theories-and even perhaps conscience-should not also fit
into this calculation, but they are not expressly welcomed.97 Second, it
may not be clear whether Patterson's theory of the truth of propositions
of law is consistent with Bobbitt's requirement of indeterminacy.
98
92. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n. 1 ("I reject both of these
positions [natural law and positivism], and indeed believe them to be united in an
unspoken expectation that the meanings of legal propositions are given by the conditions
that render them true or false.").
93. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 151-52 ("[It is not that a proposition of
law is] true if it names a relation between a proposition and some state of affairs but that
it is true if a competent legal actor could justify its assertion."); see also id. at 169-79.
Patterson does not appear to think that propositions of constitutional law are different in
any ontological sense from other propositions of law. .
94. Id. at 171-72.
95. Id. at 172. The import of this invocation is to suggest that something like a
coherence theory of truth applies; that is the sense in which Patterson speaks of potential
interpretations hanging together best with everything else we believe to be true.
96. The account appears Kuhnian in assuming that there is a best answer but not an
incontrovertible answer. See generally KUHN, REVOLUTIONS, supra note 74. Patterson's
explanation of his holistic account of the truth of propositions of law raises the question
whether his account works only if Quine is right in his holistic theory of meaning and
truth. Patterson's reliance on Quine's holism raises the question as to the strength of
Patterson's position if Quine's holism is rejected. Patterson's account could likely be
rehabilitated without substantial difficulty without Quine's holism, but space does not
permit that here.
97. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 175. Patterson's enumeration of backing
elements includes most of Bobbitt's modes of argument but excludes his ethical
argument. Id. Patterson's holism would appear to incorporate ethical judgments, and
they are not expressly excluded.
98. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 159-62.
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Given Patterson's criticism of Bobbitt's reliance on conscience,99 it is not
entirely clear how much of that indeterminacy Patterson wants to
incorporate. But Patterson can surely claim that he has offered an
account based upon public practices, which appears important to him. 100
Third, Patterson tacitly distinguishes social facts from natural
facts.'O' Natural facts are facts about the world and are the special
domain of scientific study. 102 Social facts are the facts about man with
respect to his social, political, ethical, and constitutional life that make
propositions of law true for legal positivists. 103 It is unclear whether his
rejection of the realism/anti-realism dualism extends to natural facts, as it
apparently would for Bobbitt.104 It is also not clear whether Patterson's
anti-representational theory extends to natural facts. It may be that
Patterson endorses a representational theory of language with respect to
natural facts, and to the extent that he does so, he may appear to avoid
some of the more powerful objections that Dworkin and others offered to
the anti-representational theory.0 5  It is not immediately apparent
whether such extension is of any moment in legal and constitutional
theory, however. A jurisprudential theory would appear to need to
account only for the variety of legal and constitutional language, its
meaning, and its use.
To understand and assess the anti-representational claims defended
by Bobbitt and Patterson with respect to propositions of constitutional
law, examining the controversy over much broader, yet similar claims
defended in contemporary analytic philosophy may be helpful. 106 Hilary
Putnam makes the same or similar point when he describes the disparate
99. See PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 143-46 (asserting that Bobbitt's
recursion to the exercise of the private faculty of conscience in the event of conflict
among the modes of constitutional argument cannot be reconciled with his general
account of constitutional law as a matter of public practice).
100. Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270,
306-07 (1993).
101. See Dennis Patterson, Law as a Social Fact: A Reply to Professor Martinez, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579, 583-84 (1996) [hereinafter Patterson, Social Fact].
102. Id. at 580 ("Because scientific propositions assert facts, their truth or falsity
depends on states of affairs in which the asserted propositions are true or false.").
103. PATTrERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 63 ("Social facts are the truth conditions
for propositions of law [for legal positivists].").
104. Bobbitt sometimes appears to endorse Rorty's strong anti-representational
claims. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix n. 1. Elsewhere he appears
equivocal on this issue, denying a representational account only for certain kinds of
discourse, including constitutional law, but tacitly suggesting that such a representational
account may be accurate for other types of discourse. See id. at xii (comparing
constitutional talk with scientific discourse).
105. See generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 89-96.
106. The philosophical context is helpful because the debate is carried out more
directly and the arguments advanced more clearly.
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ontological commitments that contemporary philosophers have made to
chairs, taking Willard Quine, Saul Kripke, and David Lewis as
examples.107 The fundamental tension between our commonsensical
description of what things, including ourselves, are, and what modem
science describes has long been acknowledged.108 Many philosophers
have sought to reconcile, in a variety of ways, the scientific account of
the world with our ordinary talk about the world and the objects we
encounter in it.'0 9 One conclusion that may be drawn from Putnam's
example is that even our descriptions of the most ordinary objects are not
uncontroversial or simple when we endeavor to reconcile them with the
description of the world offered by modem physics and chemistry.
Putnam's example of the chair captures the fundamental lack of
connection between representational account and reality, ' 10 Putnam cites
the controversy over the relationship between the ordinary chair and a
scientific description of the same thing as an example demonstrating that
even our ordinary notions of things-in-the-world have conventional
elements, independent of any scientific description. " I
1
Richard Rorty anticipates and acknowledges the criticisms outlined
above, but concedes no ground to his critics. Rorty expressly claims to
eschew both the realist and anti-realist positions."12  Rorty nowhere
rejects the position that moral agents can express definitive views;
indeed, he clearly believes that they can and, in appropriate contexts,
should or must make just such judgments. 113  In committing to the
possibility of such judgment, and committing himself to particular such
107. PUTNAM, REALISM, supra note 18, at 26-27 (rejecting the positions taken by
each of Quine, Kripke, and Lewis on the basis that there is not, and cannot be, an answer
to the question whether the chair of ordinary experience and discourse is identical to that
object under a scientific description).
108. See generally DESCARTES, supra note 14; WILFRID SELLARS, Philosophy and the
Scientific Image of Man, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY 1 (1963); Putnam, supra
note 14.
109. See generally SELLARS, supra note 108 (arguing that the model of the world
constructed by science does not need to be reconciled with our commonsensical notions
of persons and our society but only joined with such ordinary notions; Sellars tacitly
takes such commonsensical notions of other as actors as primary for us).
110. The example shows the multiplicity of theoretical accounts that can be
constructed of even the simplest everyday experience, and the apparent difficulty-and
for Putnam, impossibility-of choosing among them.
111. PUTNAM, REALISM, supra note 18, at 27.
112. See 3 RICHARD RORTY, Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: TRUTH AND PROGRESS 43, 47 (1998) [hereinafter RORTY,
Menace] (suggesting that Continental philosophy had made more progress than
Anglophone philosophy in transcending this debate).
113. See 1 RICHARD RORTY, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:
OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 21, 28-9 (1991) (citing and endorsing Winston
Churchill's celebrated pragmatic defense of democracy while conceding the
ethnocentrism inherent in such judgments and methods of judgment).
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judgments,114 Rorty often does not appear to be a relativist.1 5 Rorty's
lack of equivocation in expressing his judgments, coupled with his
express disavowal of relativism, has made some of his critics cautious.
Even while indicting Rorty as a relativist, Putnam, unlike Dworkin, does
not do so unequivocally.116 In his reply to Putnam and elsewhere, Rorty
is as critical of skepticism as he is of the theoretical descriptions of our
knowledge as representing the world." 7  But if there is no such
relationship between our language and beliefs and the world, how can
Rorty avoid the charges of skepticism? In fairness to Dworkin, it is a
charge that has been leveled with some frequency. 18 Rorty's clearest
statement of why he believes that he has avoided skepticism is in his
response to Putnam's attribution of that position.119 Rorty argues that
skepticism finds its potential leverage when we characterize our
knowledge as relating to an external world in a representational way and
characterize our language as also seeking to represent that world.12° If
those characterizations of our knowledge and languages are discarded,
Rorty asserts, there is no relationship that the skeptic can call into
question. Rorty confirms this rejection of such skeptical claims in his
essay on Michael Williams's Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological
Realism and the Basis of Skepticism. 2'
114. See, e.g., 3 RICHARD RORTY, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: TRUTH AND PROGRESS 167 (1998) (explaining Jefferson's
ownership of enslaved persons and more contemporary cases of torture and rape in
Bosnia by the actors' ability to deny humanity to their victims).
115. See id. His only caveat, that it may turn out to be the case that we were wrong
despite our best efforts, is not intended to undermine our existential obligation to choose,
only to acknowledge the contingency of our destiny. RORTY, Menace, supra note 112, at
53; 4 RICHARD RORTY, Honest Mistakes, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AS
CULTURAL POLITICS 56 (2007). Rorty thus appears historicist in his characterization of
value but does not appear a classical relativist. According to Rorty, history may prove us
wrong, but being proved wrong does not show that we were misguided. In the present,
there is no alternative to making our choices that define us. There is an existential
character to Rorty's stance here. See generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND
NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY N PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
1956).
116. PUTNAM, REALISM, supra note 18, at 24 (expressing concern that Rorty is
committed to relativism, but acknowledging that his position is, at the least, more
"nuanced").
117. See, e.g., RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons, supra note 10, at 153.
118. RORTY, Menace, supra note 112, at 43 (acknowledging Putnam's indictment of
Rorty as a relativist, but denying its truth).
119. Id. Of course, Rorty is not more authoritative than Putnam in characterizing his
own position. It is not a question of subjective knowledge. See generally DONALD
DAVIDSON, Three Varieties of Knowledge, in SUBJECTIVE, INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE
205 (2001).
120. RORTY, Menace, supra note 112, at 48 (citing Donald Davidson).
121. RORTY, Antiskeptical Weapons, supra note 10, at 153. He disagrees with
Williams not on the basis of Williams's claim to have offered a novel and powerful
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There are two arguments against these criticisms of Rorty's claims
and project. One pragmatic response is Wittgensteinian. One can use
words philosophically in ways that are cut off from the linguistic
practices in which they are grounded. This is the repeated lesson of the
Philosophical Investigations. That words can be purportedly used in
such nonsensical or confused ways does not establish that they
necessarily have meanings in those contexts, too. 22  The pragmatist
posits that the claims about the external world and of the correspondence
with such world are examples of such distortion of language. The proof,
as with Wittgenstein, is the perplexities and confusions that attend such
non-canonical use. Dworkin argues that the alleged non-canonical use is
not dissimilar to our ordinary usage. For Dworkin, such claims about the
external, real world are thus more like "It is 5 PM in Valparaiso,
Indiana," than "It is 5 PM on the sun." Rorty, however, denies that
claims about the world are consistent with our ordinary practices.
Dworkin's assertion that even philosophical propositions must be
understood and given meaning in the context of their philosophical usage
appears questionable. 123 Wittgenstein would treat such non-canonical
contexts as often presenting merely linguistic pathologies. 124 Consider
the relationship of philosophy to law and to constitutional theory and
interpretation. Implicit in Dworkin's claim is a recognition that our law
talk is deeply embedded in a set of performatives. It may not be as
simple or direct as Wittgenstein's example of the stone carrier saying
"Five!", but in law in particular, we often do something when we say or
write something. It is this recognition that leads Dworkin to claim that
our linguistic practices, even when we talk about law, are embedded in
canonical linguistic uses. For Dworkin, such usage is more like the stone
carrier than the metaphysician.
Rorty would amplify the Wittgensteinian position, integrating it
with American pragmatism to create the second argument in defense of
his position.125  Rorty would not so much deny that propositions
correspond to reality as urge that notions of causal connection replace
that discourse.126  Instead of seeking to determine the truth of
propositions and theories, Rorty would assess the usefulness of those
theories and propositions. He asks us to think of ourselves not as
response to the skeptical challenge, but on the more basic question whether the old
arguments against skepticism were inadequate. Id.
122. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 18, at § 350 (asking what it means to be five o'clock
on the sun).
123. See id. §§ 114-20.
124. Id.
125. See generally RORTY, Menace, supra note 112, at 44-62 (articulating the areas
of agreement and disagreement between Rorty and Putnam, from Rorty's perspective).
126. Id. at 47-48.
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mirroring or picturing the world but as acting within it for our own
interests and purposes, and to value and preserve and honor propositions
and claims as and to the extent that they aid us.
Turning back to Bobbitt and constitutional theory, the consequences
of rejecting a correspondence theory of truth in particular and the
peculiar view that Bobbitt takes of the applicability of truth conditions in
general are substantial. Bobbitt does not entirely deny that propositions
of constitutional law have truth conditions; but, he asserts, a "grasp of
[the meaning of legal propositions] cannot depend upon an ability to
recognize those conditions as obtaining in cases in which they can be
conclusively so recognized."127 It may not be immediately apparent
what Bobbitt is asserting here. Later, in Reflections Inspired by My
Critics, he amplifies his position: "Some may take [me] as implying that
legal propositions cannot therefore be true or false. I do not deny that
legal propositions have truth-conditions. I deny only that these can be
satisfied in any nontrivial way-in any way external to the practice
itself."'
121
Bobbitt is describing a non-foundational practice of constitutional
law. Without traditional truth conditions, a proposition cannot be
objectively determined to be true or false even in theory. To deny
propositions of constitutional law objectively recognizable truth
conditions is to radically redescribe the nature of those propositions. We
ordinarily accept such propositions as true or false, and we argue about
the truth of contested propositions. The originalism debate, after all, is a
debate about the grounds that make propositions of constitutional law
true or false. The protagonists in that debate proceed as if there are such
truth conditions and their opponents simply disagree about what those
truth conditions are. For a proposition of constitutional law not to have
traditional truth conditions entails that logical arguments constructed
with such positions cannot have similar truth conditions and therefore
that such arguments cannot be valid or invalid in the ordinary way.
Originalism, and its critics, are fatally compromised.
127. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1908. Bobbitt's acknowledgment of the
potential for conflict between the different modes of constitutional argument and his
insistence that there is not, and cannot be, a meta-mode that can reconcile such
inconsistent arguments might appear to commit him to the view that Dworkin is wrong.
On the other hand, his confidence that conscience can provide guidance in such cases of
conflict, coupled with a rejection of moral relativism, would permit him to endorse
Dworkin's thesis.
128. Id. at 1914. The critical element of Bobbitt's claim is not what constitutes truth,
but the claim that such truth claims are trivial because reducible to claims about practice.
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Bobbitt and Patterson's challenge to the realist theory of the truth of
propositions of constitutional law has been controversial.'29  George
Martinez rejects Patterson's theory of the truth of propositions of
constitutional law because of its appeal to overall coherence when the
modalities of argument conflict.' 30  He rejects that theory because he
endorses a realist theory of constitutional law. 13  Martinez asserts that
Bobbitt's account of the truth of constitutional law is inadequate because
it fails to explain the truth of propositions of constitutional law. This is
because Martinez believes that there is something that makes such
propositions true-or false. 132 For Martinez, propositions of
constitutional law are made true by the world.1 33  But there is little
defense of that realist position, except to argue that earlier confidence in
celebrated constitutional decisions and associated propositions of
constitutional law appear erroneous in retrospect. 134
3. The Meaning of Propositions of Constitutional Law
Bobbitt focuses less on the meaning of propositions of
constitutional law than upon their use. That lack of express attention
should not obscure the radical position implicit in Bobbitt's analysis.
But Bobbitt's failure to analyze the nature of meaning for propositions of
constitutional law more fully leads him to overlook important arguments
for his claims. Moreover, once the importance of meaning is recognized,
significant developments in the contemporary analytic philosophy of
language suggest further arguments for Bobbitt's claims.
Classically, and for the principal protagonists in their debate over
originalism, the meaning of propositions is principally a semantic
meaning. 35 Semantic meaning is the import of the words and sentences,
129. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, Book Review: On Law and Truth, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 883, 891 (1997) [hereinafter Martinez, Review] (reviewing Patterson's Law
and Truth, Martinez concluded "Patterson's project should be rejected .. "); see also
George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 545 (1996); Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2.
130. Martinez, Review, supra note 129, at 902-03.
131. Id. at 903-04.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 904.
134. Id. at 903 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson as tacitly reliant on racist premises). While
the argumentative force of Martinez's criticism is weak, the passion behind his resistance
of any theory that may appear to apologize for, or tolerate, racist precedents is
understandable. See Patterson, Social Fact, supra note 101, at 583-84 (distinguishing
social facts from natural facts and defending his anti-representational account of how we
make legal propositions true).
135. Even the definition of the scope of semantics and pragmatics is not
uncontroversial. For two very different definitions of each, see Charles Travis,
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independent of what such words and sentences are inferred to mean and
independent of how such words and sentences are used.136 For some
theorists, semantic meanings are inextricably linked with truth conditions
for statements. 137 That definition of semantic meaning derives from the
semantic meaning of the words used in the proposition, together with the
application of the rules of syntax.138  Bobbitt rejects this account of
linguistic meaning. 39
In Bobbitt's non-foundationalist world, the meaning of such
propositions derives largely from their use in a variety of social practices.
One such use is to perform actions-to do things, in the vernacular.
140
For example, certain propositions of constitutional law are used to
prevent mentally impaired criminals from being executed by the state. 141
Propositions of constitutional law also figure as conclusions in certain
inferences and as premises or grounds for other inferences. 142 These uses
also inform the meaning of such propositions. These social practices,
many of them highly articulated and elaborate linguistic practices
themselves, determine the meanings of constitutional provisions in
Bobbitt's anti-foundational, anti-representational account of language. 143
Perhaps because Bobbitt devotes so little express attention to
meaning, he misses the opportunity to reinforce his argument with a
fuller account of pragmatics and inference in constitutional language.1
44
Pragmatics, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 87, 87 (Bob Hale &
Crispin Wright eds., 1st paperback ed. 1999) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE].
136. See generally id.
137. Frege is the original source of this strategy. See generally FREGE, supra note 14.
For more contemporary endorsements of this strategy, see David Lewis, General
Semantics, in SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 169, 169 (Donald Davidson & Gilbert
Harman eds., 1972), cited in PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 135, at 87, 106 n.2;
DONALD DAVIDSON, Truth and Meaning, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION
17 (2d ed. 2001).
138. One sometimes also identifies the semantic rules that construct the meaning of
propositions from the meaning of the words that comprise the proposition. In any case,
the implications drawn from the literal, semantic meaning are not generally included.
139. Bobbitt's rejection of such a traditional theory of meaning based upon truth
conditions follows from his position on truth. See BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at xix-xx n. 1.
140. See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989); J.L. AUSTIN,
How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
141. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 410 (1986) (deciding as a matter
of first impression that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane
"whether . . . to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance ... ").
142. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1908.
143. See BOBBITT, FATE supra note 11, at 6.
144. See, e.g., 1 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE:
WHAT IT MEANS AND How WE USE IT 403, 422 (2008) (concluding that "the meanings of
legal texts are too austere to determine the content of law"). See generally BRANDOM,
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Pragmatics looks to the use of language to understand the non-semantic
meaning of a statement or utterance.145  An inferential account of
language supplements that account of the performative role of language
with the role of propositions in inference. 146 Propositions play two roles
in inference, as premises and as conclusions. 1
47
Just as Patterson builds on Bobbitt's account of truth while offering
his own theory, so, too, Patterson's account of meaning begins with
Bobbitt.148  Like Bobbitt,149 Patterson appears to believe that
jurisprudence must move beyond the opposition between realism and
anti-realism in its account of meaning.150 Patterson largely abandoned
traditional accounts of the meaning of a proposition of law as determined
by truth conditions.151 Instead, meaning is determined by a proposition's
use in canonical modes of legal argument. 1
52
. Two important strands in modem analytic philosophy of language
support Bobbitt and Patterson's claims. The relationship between the
two is complex, and they emphasize different aspects of constitutional
language and its use. The first aspect is pragmatics, the analysis of how
language is used, as distinguished from what it semantically means.
53
The second is inferentialism, which focuses upon the importance of the
use of propositions as conclusions of certain inferences and as the
premises in others. ' 54 The importance of pragmatics becomes apparent
when we recognize that the Constitution and the courts in their judicial
opinions are not simply saying something, but they are also, and more
importantly, doing something. 55 The Constitution is in fact doing many
things. It is constituting the federal government,156 as well as creating
ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70; GRICE, supra note 140; AUSTIN, supra note 140.
The breadth of the recognition of the importance of non-semantic meaning, including, in
particular, for propositions of law, is reflected in the authors cited here, who otherwise
disagree on so much.
145. This characterization ofpragmatics is not uncontroversial. See generally Travis,
supra note 135.
146. See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70; ROBERT
BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT (1994) [hereinafter BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT].
147. See BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70, at 165-66.
148. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 178-79 (asserting that an account of law
based only on the modes of legal argument is inadequate).
149. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n. 1.
150. PATrERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 18-21.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id. at 21 ("[M]eaning is not to be explained as a matter of conditions.").
153. See generally WHERE SEMANTICS MEETS PRAGMATICS (Klaus von Heuesinger &
Ken Turner eds., 2006).
154. See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70; BRANDOM,
MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 146.
155. See generally AUSTIN, supra note 140.
156. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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and apportioning roles and functions among the three branches of that
government157 and between the two houses of the legislative branch.
158
It is also ordering the relationship between the federal government and
the sovereign states. 159 Very importantly, it is limiting the power of the
federal and state governments and creating or confirming the rights of
individuals.160  As a performative statement, the Constitution is quite
different from Joseph Story's commentaries on the Constitution of
Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Law. Those works merely
interpret and explain the Constitution. As a result, with respect to the
Constitution and constitutional opinions, the most important element of
the text is what it accomplishes, not what its semantic content is. 161
An understanding of this performative role explains the doctrine of
substantive due process better than conventional analysis permits. John
Hart Ely has lampooned the doctrine of substantive due process as
oxymoronic, embodying a contradiction in terms.162  As a matter of
semantic meaning, Ely is correct. Nevertheless, the failure of Ely's
criticism to be taken seriously is puzzling. In the face of Ely's charge
that the concept of substantive due process is oxymoronic, the continuing
vitality of the doctrine appears paradoxical. But the doctrine of
substantive due process cannot be analyzed or evaluated only in semantic
terms. The doctrine must be understood in the context of the judicial
decisions that created it 163 and that continue to apply it. 164  In that
context, the doctrine can be understood as the means by which the
nineteenth century precedents narrowly interpreting the privileges and
immunities clause165 have been finessed by a Supreme Court willing to
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, II and Il1.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I.
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting the States from entering into treaties,
conferring titles of nobility, generally levying duties, and keeping troops, among other
things).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
161. As explored below, however, the conceptual content of constitutional
propositions is important for the inferential role such propositions play as performatives.
162. See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 18.
163. By characterizing this doctrine as modem, I am contrasting it with earlier
versions of substantive due process that limited state social legislation by invoking rights
of economic freedom. The relationship of the two is beyond this Article's scope. For
examples of the modem doctrine, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
165. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the




extend a variety of protections to individuals.166 The doctrine is a
creative way for the Court to endorse structural and ethical arguments at
the expense of textual and historical arguments, 167 without the need to
reverse long-standing precedents. 168
The relevant, if difficult, question is whether the Court reached its
result with the proper use of the accepted modes of argument. The
critical reaction from sophisticated constitutional theorists to the
Supreme Court decisions raises legitimate questions as to the results
obtained. 169 Part of that critical reaction arose from the seemingly novel
style of argument employed by the Court.170 Assessing the debate over
Griswold v. Connecticut, 17 Roe v. Wade,'
72 and Lawrence v. Texas, 73
goes beyond our scope here. But resolving that controversy requires far
more than noting the infelicity of the nomenclature of substantive due
process. 174
Understanding the inferential role of propositions of constitutional
law is also important for understanding the non-semantic meaning of the
Constitution. Propositions of constitutional law, like other propositions
on the inferentialist account, stand as the conclusions of certain
inferences of practical reasoning and as the premises for other such
inferences. For example, the proposition that "the initial clause of the
Second Amendment is only prefatory" may figure as a premise in an
inference to the conclusion that the Second Amendment does not protect
166. Thus, for example, the doctrine has been invoked to recognize a right to secure
contraception, the right in certain circumstances to abortion, and the right to engage in
consensual adult homosexual relations.
167. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invoking
the paramount rights of familial association in an ethical argument for the limits of state
police powers); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (referencing the central right of
corporeal autonomy and sexual choice in an ethical argument striking down a state's
general prohibition of abortion).
168. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). It may be, of course,
that such an indirect doctrinal strategy has costs and consequences that a direct strategy
would not.
169. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo4 A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, Wages] (arguing that the overuse of
highly critical rhetoric in assessing the Supreme Court's decisions results in less
credibility when really questionable decisions like Roe are handed down). These
criticisms raise the genealogical question of the relationship of originalism to the
decisions of the Warren Court. That is a topic I turn to in Striding Out of Babel: The
Promise of the American Constitution If We Leave the Unhappy Originalism Debate
Behind (July 17, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
170. See, e.g., Ely, Wages, supra note 169.
171. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
173. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
174. I do not mean to suggest with this comment that Ely's substantive discussion of
Roe or of substantive due process is compromised by such a mistake.
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only the rights to possess firearms of those citizens who participate in
militias. 175 Similarly, the proposition that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits lashing as a cruel and unusual punishment appears to commit
anyone endorsing that proposition to the premise that there are non-
historical elements to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. That, in turn,
raises questions as to whether the Eighth Amendment would or would
not prohibit the death penalty today. Understanding the inferentialist
account of propositions of constitutional law tempers the performative
account of constitutional law and provides the explanation of the
conceptual account of that law and practice.
Neither Bobbitt nor Patterson expressly articulates either a
functional, performative account of constitutional provisions or an
express, inferentialist account of propositions of constitutional law. But
they do repeatedly and expressly indicate their endorsement of such a
pragmatic, functional account in citing Wittgenstein.176  Such a
refinement would help to fill in the account of constitutional argument as
central to truth and meaning. Thus, although such a performative
account that emphasizes pragmatics rather than semantics is not express
in Bobbitt's discussion, it is probably inherent there, and certainly not
inconsistent therewith. Similarly, an inferentialist account is consistent
with Bobbitt's emphasis on the constitutional practice of making
arguments because the inferentialist theory emphasizes the role of
constitutional propositions as premises and conclusions in practical
reasoning.
4. Constitutional Argument
Although meaning is of relatively little import for Bobbitt's account
of the Constitution, constitutional argument plays a central role. Bobbitt
does not focus on the structure of practical inference in constitutional
argument. He is instead interested only in the premises and grounds, and
the associated metrics, employed in the disparate modes of such
argument.177  As for Dworkin, Bobbitt's account of constitutional law
begins with legal dispute and legal argument. Also, like Dworkin,
Bobbitt finds the canonical accounts likely wrong, and misleading at
175. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789-90 (2008) (making
just such an argument for the conclusion that the right to firearms protected by the
Second Amendment extends to citizens without regard to service in the militia).
176. See, e.g., Patterson, Social Fact, supra note 101, at 580; BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi; BOBBiI, FATE supra note 11, at 123, 266 n. 1.
177. Patterson, by contrast, explores the structure of such practical reasoning in some
detail. PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 170-72 (developing a more informal
account of legal reasoning, following Toulmin, that identifies the warrant, backing, and
ground that support a claim).
[Vol. 119:1
THE ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE
best. But Bobbitt's use of legal argument is far more radical than
Dworkin's. Dworkin uses his description of legal disputes to challenge
the positivist account of law, but he accepts classical correspondence
accounts of truth and a realist account of the world. 178 From his anti-
foundational, anti-representational premises, Bobbitt argues that
constitutional argument is our constitutional law.179 Law is an activity,
not a thing.'
80
Constitutional argument has a specialized meaning for Bobbitt; it is
argument for particular constitutional outcomes to or by legal decision
makers. 181 That is, it is the form of argument that determines how a legal
outcome is presented, even if those forms do not determine legal
outcomes. 182 It is distinguished from the more general concept of legal
discourse, conversations about the Constitution by decision makers as
well as by sociologists, historians, and philosophers.'83  Bobbitt
catalogues six established modes of constitutional argument in his first
book, Constitutional Fate.'84 The force of Bobbitt's challenge rests on
the accuracy of his description of constitutional argument and his
theoretical description of the legitimacy of the competing modes.
Bobbitt's analytical strategy begins with a description of how
constitutional arguments have been historically made.185 He asserts the
existence of these modes as a contingent, historical fact.186 The most
striking aspect of that description is its emphasis upon the debate, the
controversy, and the arguments of constitutional law. He delights in
selecting brilliant but now largely discredited theorists like William
Crosskey187 and Felix Frankfurter. 188 By choosing historical figures who
178. See generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 87-89.
179. Patterson would generalize this theory of the Constitution for all law. See
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 151-79, 151 (quoting HILARY PUTNAM,
REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 115 (1988): "[T]o say that some proposition is true is to
say that 'a sufficiently well placed speaker who used the words in that way would be
fully warranted in counting the statement as true of that situation."' (footnote omitted)).
Patterson also offers a materially different theoretical account of law when the modes of
argument conflict, rejecting the notion that conscience plays a dispositive role at that
stage. See id. at 172.
180. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 24.
181. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1911-12.
182. See BOBBITT, FATE supra note 11, at 6-7.
183. Id. See also Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1776-77
(describing the use of arguments outside Bobbitt's six modes in constitutional
interpretation as "a sort of category mistake" on Bobbitt's account).
184. BOBBITT, FATE supra note 11, at 7-119.
185. See generally id. at3-119.
186. Id. at 8.
187. See id. at 13-21 (focusing upon New Deal constitutional analysis emphasizing
the strong powers of the Federal government particularly with respect to economic
legislation).
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espoused powerful and often dominant constitutional interpretations and
modes of constitutional judicial decision making, Bobbitt constructs a
thick description of our constitutional practice in which constitution
argument has primacy. Bobbitt chronicles a constitutional discourse over
time that does not reach definitive or final conclusions but instead
reaches decisions informed by text and history, as well as by competing
values, roles, virtues, and expediencies. The product of that practice is
not ultimate truth but accepted and legitimate judgments and decisions.
Bobbitt does not suggest that anything about this discourse is illegitimate
or even in need of reform. Instead, Bobbitt endorses this discourse
enthusiastically, manifestly excited by, and admiring of, its practitioners
even when he clearly disagrees with their views.189  The structure of
these arguments is historical and contingent. 90 That is, the arguments
are rooted in America's historical experience, not in philosophy. Our
constitutional law would have been different without slavery, without the
Civil War, without the Great Depression, without the New Deal, without
the Second World War, or without the so-called War on Terror. The
practice of constitutional interpretation responds to and reflects those
events more than the abstract philosophizing of John Locke or John
Rawls. While Bobbitt has defended his description of modes of
argument as an accurate description of the way constitutional argument
goes, he acknowledges that the existing modes may fall out of favor or
new modes may be adopted.1 91 Bobbitt's description of constitutional
188. Id. at 59-73 (exploring Justice Frankfiurter's prudential analysis emphasizing
factors and the balancing of often competing considerations).
189. For example, Bobbitt describes William Crosskey's now discredited views of
the original understanding of the Constitution with relish, savoring the legal brilliance
both with which they were argued and with which they were rebutted, while enjoying the
irony of the commitment to original understanding by a liberal New Dealer. See id. at 9-
24.
190. Bobbitt stated:
Does that mean, then, that my work is necessarily bound to the present system,
that it cannot account for change, such as the development of new modalities or
new standards of arguments within modalities? Not at all. Because the
constitutional system of establishing these forms is entirely descriptive of
practice, any change that is sufficiently widespread becomes a legitimate
participant.
Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1918-19.
191. Id. at 1919. It is not entirely clear how such change would occur. Presumably it
would be along the lines of the efforts of the various advocates of particular modes of
argument chronicled in Constitutional Fate. In any case, to the extent that Bobbitt is
expressly and consistently committed to the contingent and historical nature of these
modes, such change would surely be entirely consistent with the story Bobbitt tells, even
if the story of the evolution of such modes of argument remains untold by Bobbitt
himself. In his earlier work Bobbitt conceded that his litany of arguments might not be
complete. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 8.
[Vol. 119:1
THE ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE
argument and decision making appears more plausible and accurate than
that advocated by the originalists or by Dworkin.' 
92
Ethical argument, as Bobbitt terms it, is not moral argument.'
93
Rather, it is an argument based upon "the character, or ethos, of the
American polity .... 194 Crudely, it is the type of argument made when
we appeal to what it means to be Americans, or to our higher
aspirations.195 Much of Constitutional Fate is devoted to defending the
mode of ethical argument as an integral part of the culture and practice of
constitutional argument. This claim is particularly important; because if
open-ended ethical argument is permissible, then it is more plausible that
the entire process of constitutional decision making is open-ended. If the
only two modes of constitutional argument were textual and historical,
then the originalist account of interpretation as an almost mechanical
decision process would be far more plausible, and Bobbitt's rich, anti-
foundationalist account would be less plausible. The inclusion of ethical
argument-which has little to do with what the Framers said or
intended-ensures that Bobbitt must reject originalism. 
196
Bobbitt anticipated that his claim that ethical argument is an
accepted mode of constitutional argument would be one of the most
192. Although Bobbitt identifies six modes of constitutional argument, nearly half the
text of Constitutional Fate is devoted to exploring one of them, ethical argument, to
establish it as a legitimate and legitimating mode. Part of the explanation for the
emphasis on the ethical mode of argument is that the other modes are both more visible
and more well established. Bobbitt recognizes that ethical argument is more
controversial; it is also, for Bobbitt, an extremely important element in his description of
constitutional argument. BOBBir, FATE, supra note 11, at 93 ("I now turn to one
particular sort of argument whose very status as a coherent convention would be perhaps
controversial.").
193. Id. at 94, 137, 140-41, 94 ("As I shall use the term, ethical arguments are not
moral arguments."). It might appear that such an ethical argument is an appeal to a
vision of the flourishing of the American people. As such it might appear a moral
argument from the good. Bobbitt does not explore these issues in much depth. But see
Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1637,
1700 n.128 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics]. I will explore the parallels and
contrasts between Bobbitt's theory and natural law theories below.
194. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 94.
195. Bobbitt's formulation raises the question whether his concept of ethical
argument commits him to American exceptionalism. Although I am unsure of the answer
to that question, it would appear that even if Bobbitt is so committed and even if such a
commitment appears indefensible, his concept of an ethical argument can be
reconstructed with such commitments.
196. To the extent that the Framers helped to articulate the national ethos, those
views, including their embodiment in the Constitution, are relevant, but this is a
relationship to a text very different from that posited by originalism. Bobbitt's
commitment to structural and prudential argument as equal modes is also inconsistent
with originalism.
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novel and controversial elements in his theory of the Constitution.197 It
has proven so.198 Although he gives examples of the use of ethical
argument,199 it may be helpful to define it conceptually and compare it,
for example, to Dworkin's concept of the role of moral argument in
constitutional law and the role of moral theory and argument in natural
law. Bobbitt characterizes ethical argument as the appeal to the character
of America, the core of our aspirations as Americans. It is a historical
claim about who we are as citizens of the American democratic
constitutional republic. Such arguments could not be made in those
terms in the United Kingdom or in France, for example, despite the many
common threads that these polities share with the United States in their
political philosophy and political practices as advanced western
democracies.
Bobbitt does not offer an account of the creation of such aspirations
or self-image.20 0  But those aspirations are evolving.20 1 Whether the
adoption of the Bill of Rights reflects such an evolution, or merely
constitutes a codification of commitments in place at the adoption of the
Constitution, the adoption of the Reconstruction amendments and the
197. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 125 ("[E]thical approaches are thought to be
disreputable and are usually treated disparagingly .. .").
198. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1802-03; see LEITER,
Quine, supra note 19, at 138-39 (addressing Patterson's interpretation of Bobbitt's
account of constitutional law).
199. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 96-105 (presenting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Pentagon Papers Case,
and Trop v. Dulles as examples of ethical argument in constitutional decision making).
200. That narrative has been well established, at least in outline. Because of the
strongly republican elements of a limited government, critical elements of that ethos
clearly evolved out of the Western, Christian legal and political traditions and were
shaped by the experiences of the English colonies up to the Revolution. See generally
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); see also Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism:
The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992). Parallel doctrinal streams of
importance included the philosophy of John Locke as well as the thinking of the Scottish
Enlightenment. See generally GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (First Mariner Books ed. 2002) (emphasizing the
importance of Scottish enlightenment thinking).
201. This evolution implicitly figures, for example, in Bobbitt's account of the shifts
in the predominant modes of constitutional argument, but without any express
acknowledgment as such. The creation of the prudential argument as an express mode of
constitutional argument in the twentieth century is perhaps the clearest example. See
BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 61-65. Tribe's explanation and analysis of
constitutional law by reference to evolving paradigms or frameworks has parallels with
Bobbitt's account, but Tribe's description, unlike Bobbitt's, appears to have a clear
temporal direction. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (describing successive models of
the Constitution that shaped constitutional interpretation and decision over time).
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extension of the franchise to women certainly reflect such an
evolution.2 °2 Bobbitt also recognizes that those aspirations evolve as
constitutional doctrine evolves.2 °3 We evolve in our interpretation of the
Constitution, but so, too, do we ourselves evolve as our constitutional
interpretations and practices shape us.20 4 The clearest examples in this
regard may be those with respect to the rights of minorities and women.
As the rights of such persons to be treated equally have been recognized
within our society, the protections accorded those persons have been
expanded. That expansion has conveyed an aspirational message as to
how we may build a more diverse and tolerant community.20 5
The commitments underlying ethical arguments are not moral
commitments because they may not be consistent with our moral
obligations.20 6 This distinction is grounded in both empirical and
theoretical considerations. Empirically, ethical argument is rarely made
expressly in constitutional argument, and when made, it is even less
often asserted in an express moral theory vocabulary.20 7 Despite the
scorn poured on moral theory applied in law by judges and theorists as
different as Judge Posner and Justice Scalia,2 °8 there is scant evidence of
an active role for such theory in adjudication.20 9 If Bobbitt is to
rehabilitate the role of ethical theory in constitutional argument, he must
distinguish it from ordinary moral argument. He does so by limiting the
kind of argument that he characterizes as ethical. While he sometime
speaks loosely about such an argument as appealing to the ethos of the
American people, in his more measured statements, it is clear that he
intends the notion to mean appeals to limits on government that preserve
202. The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment probably stands as one of the few
manifestly failed efforts raise the bar of behavior for Americans by prohibiting the
manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. That effort was effectively abandoned by the
adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment.
203. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 185.
204. As Bobbitt puts it pithily, "I do not believe that we are born with a taste for jury
trials .... " Id. It is this sense that we are shaped by our American Constitution that
leads Bobbitt to speak of "constitutional fate."
205. Jack Balkin offers the clearest statement of this aspirational role for the
Constitution. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 60-62.
206. Bobbitt clearly believes that our law may not reflect our highest moral
obligations and may perhaps be immoral. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 141
(citing Chief Justice Marshall for the distinction between the moral and the constitutional
in the context of the Cherokee cases).
207. Id. at 128.
208. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 193; Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION].
209. But see Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1739, 1743
(1998) [hereinafter Fried, Philosophy] (reporting, anecdotally, that as a judge he had
recourse to such analysis).
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important, generally shared values of the people.2'0 As he puts it, the
government is not sovereign in all ways, and, in certain domains, is not
sovereign at all with respect to the people of the United States.2
At other times, however, Bobbitt seems to characterize his ethical
212argument as a form of moral argument. Such ethical argument
contains a normative content that goes beyond an aesthetic judgment or
raw personal preference. The distinction between moral and ethical
argument is also important in Bobbitt's effort to distinguish between the
legitimacy of constitutional decisions and the justification for such
213decisions. Ethical argument is one of the legitimating modes of
constitutional argument; 2 14 moral argument is one of the means of
justification. Ethical argument is deployed within constitutional law,
moral argument, from outside. In Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt's interest
is in legitimacy because in legitimacy Bobbitt claims to ground judicial
review and dissolve the countermajoritarian challenge.215 According to
Bobbitt, the legitimacy of judicial review arises from the practice of
judicial review; there is no higher, Archimedean stance from which such
constitutional practices can be critiqued within law itself.216 This denial
of a stance from which to determine, within constitutional law, whether
judicial review is legitimate, is one of Bobbitt's most important claims.
With it comes a rejection of the entire structure of the historical debate
over the legitimacy of judicial review.217  That debate was conducted,
after all, on the assumption that judicial review could be legitimated only
if a principled argument justifying such a judicial role could be
210. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 94-95 ("Ethical constitutional arguments do
not claim that the particular solution [advocated] is right or wrong in any sense larger
than that the solution comports with the sort of people we are . ). This is not, in
fairness to Bobbitt's critics, an entirely perspicuous claim.
211. Id. at 132.
212. Id. at 137. Explaining the resistance to recognizing the place of ethical
argument in constitutional argument and adjudication, Bobbitt attributes the resistance to
a desire to exclude "moral argument from constitutional law altogether." Id. This
formulation suggests a moral dimension to the concept of ethical argument.
213. For criticism of that distinction and Bobbitt's defense of it, see Balkin &
Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1771-72, 1802-03; LEITER, Quine, supra note 19,
at 139; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1918-19 (defending the distinction by
characterizing justification as an assessment that must be made from outside our system
of constitutional law to with legitimation which occurs within that system by making
arguments within the accepted modes of our constitutional practice).
214. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 93-119.
215. Id. at237-38.
216. See generally LEITER, Quine, supra note 19, at 138-39.
217. Bobbitt recognizes this implication, generally parodying the prior state of the
debate over judicial review. See BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 6-10.
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articulated.218 Bobbitt's claim with respect to judicial review has not
been generally accepted.219
Critics have leveled a variety of objections to Bobbitt's theory of
legitimation and his distinction between legitimacy and justification.
The first challenge is that Bobbitt conflates sociological description with
normative analysis.22°  According to this account, Bobbitt simply
confuses what is done with what ought to be done, committing, for some,
a primitive category mistake.2  What is done cannot be the premise for
a practical inference to what ought to be done.222 Bobbitt sometime
speaks from within the practice when he speaks of legitimation, and
sometime speaks from outside that practice, claiming a normative
conclusion from such empirical practices.223 In so doing, Bobbitt may
appear to conflate the domain of what is with the domain of ought and
obligation.
At the legal, constitutional level, Bobbitt claims a normative
conclusion from his account of practice.224  But that claim is limited
because it is expressly not the only normative perspective from which the
constitutional law may be evaluated. Moreover, it is not a moral
perspective.225 Bobbitt's ethical perspective is instead a shared, internal
point of view with respect to certain practices, values, habits, and
institutions. For example, Bobbitt offers an ethical reading of Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,226 which held that a zoning law that prohibited a
grandmother from living in the same household with her minor
grandchild whom she was raising violated the Due Process clause.227
218. See, e.g., id. (describing Bobbitt's account of the debate).
219. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 1; ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 6 (2011) (suggesting that "[t]here may be no
perfect solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty").
220. See LEITER, Quine, supra note 19, at 138-39.
221. Cf BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 219, at 12 (cryptically acknowledging
potential criticism of originalism as committing a similar error in deriving arguments for
originalism from concerns about judicial review). For the classic statement of the
concept of a category mistake, now largely discounted, see GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT
OF MIND 15-18 (1949).
222. The locus classicus for this claim is DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 451-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888) [hereinafter HUME, TREATISE].
223. See Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1778-81.
224. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 94-95 (defending that decision as proper
within the standards of the American ethos).
225. The claim is normative because, on Bobbitt's account, there are grammatical
and ungrammatical constitutional arguments. Ungrammatical arguments made outside
the accepted and proper six modes of constitutional argument are flawed as constitutional
argument. Bobbitt acknowledges that such arguments may be powerful and persuasive
morally or dramatically, for example, but denies that they have any comparable status as
a matter of law.
226. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
227. Id. at 505-06.
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Bobbitt argues that the outcome in that case turned on the importance of
family relationships and distinguishes that case from Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,228 which upheld a similar zoning law prohibiting
multiple unrelated persons from sharing a household. In Village of Belle
Terre, the members of the shared household shared no familial
relationship, and the Court accorded their associational claims less
weight, on the one hand, while according the state's exercise of its police
power to regulate housing more deference than in the case when that
power intruded into the freedom of a family.
Rochin v. California229 presented the question of whether a criminal
suspect in the custody of the police could be given an emetic so as to
induce vomiting to recover potential evidence.230 The Court held that
such conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment assurance of Due
Process.231 Bobbitt argues that the terms in which the Court articulated
its reasoning were misleading. The Court emphasized the testimonial
nature of the evidence obtained by forcibly pumping the defendant's
stomach. 23 Instead, Bobbitt argues that the case demonstrates that "a
constitutional ethic applies.., that restrains the police from physically
degrading an individual who is in custody in their efforts to enforce the
law .... ,,233 In each case, Bobbitt reinterprets the case to find an ethical
principle of limited government and a realm of constitutionally protected
234individual autonomy. Bobbitt's reading is not wholly compelling.
The Court expressly invoked the requirement that the States respect
"certain decencies of civilized conduct.,235 There is reason to believe
that such concerns are heightened when the State is engaged in a criminal
prosecution. Whether that rule implicates a principle of individual
autonomy is not entirely clear.
Critics argue that Bobbitt does not sustain the distinction he
purports to draw between describing practices and making normative
commitments.236 They argue that as a grammarian he must vacillate
between the normative and the descriptive.237  When he makes
descriptive claims about our practice of constitutional argument,
Bobbitt's account appears to fail to engage originalists making normative
claims about what our Constitution should be understood to mean or is
228. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
229. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
230. Id. at 166.
231. Id. at 174.
232. Id. at 172-73.
233. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 105.
234. Id.
235. 342 U.S. at 173.




required to be understood to mean. When he makes normative claims
about that practice, Bobbitt appears to violate his own claim that the
practice of constitutional argument cannot be critiqued or assessed, as a
matter of constitutional law, from outside that practice. Critics allege
that Bobbitt invokes exactly the external perspective he denies.38
Bobbitt sometimes appears to employ ethical argument much like
natural law theories employ a theory of natural rights,239 but he
nevertheless maintains that he is not defending a natural law theory.240
He repudiates natural law theory on at least two different levels. First, he
denies that moral argument has any role in our modes of constitutional
argument.241 Natural law asserts a fundamental nexus between law and
natural rights, with a corollary role for moral argument in our law.242
Even modem natural law theory, which tempers the role claimed for
moral theory, nevertheless commits to such a role.243 Second, and more
fundamentally, Bobbitt rejects the representational, correspondence
account of the truth of propositions of constitutional law that is inherent
in both classical and modern natural law. Both natural law theories
commit to an ontology of law in which the truth value of propositions of
law derives from the correspondence of such propositions with an
objective law. 44 Thus, Bobbitt rejects the claims natural law makes for
the priority or privilege of morality and its more fundamental ontological
claims about law itself.
Bobbitt also thinks that his theory differs from Dworkin's theory of
law as integrity and its non-positivist emphasis of the role of moral
theory in constitutional interpretation.245 Most fundamentally, Bobbitt
238. Id. at 1782-83 ("[Bobbitt] cannot maintain the distinction between legitimacy
and justification in practice.").
239. Thus, for example, when Bobbitt explores the interpretation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, he argues that it is a limitation on the exercise of state power and
that such limitation is not restricted to the historical state law privileges and immunities
of citizens. The limitation limits the states from acting, and thus limits the state from
acting in derogation of such limit against anyone. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at
151-53.
240. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (distinguishing moral argument from ethical argument
without referring to natural law theory).
241. See id. at 94.
242. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in IN DEFENSE
OF NATURAL LAW 102 (1999).
243. The new natural law theory recognizes that there are benefits from the
specification of rights and obligations in law and that the open-ended, de novo analysis of
those specified rights and obligations through moral deliberation by judges and citizens
may be undesirable or counterproductive for the good. See generally id.
244. See generally GEORGE, supra note 242, at 102 (emphasizing the proper and
permissible instrumental role of positive law in implementing the purposes and principles
of natural law) (1999); JOHN FiNNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
245. See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29.
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distinguishes his concept of ethical argument from Dworkin's account of
moral reasoning in two critical respects. First, ethical arguments limit
government; they do not grant or extend government powers or
mandates.246 Ethical argument preserves the rights of the people against
governmental intrusion. For Dworkin, by contrast, moral argument is as
likely to mandate action by the government as to restrict it. 247 Second,
and more importantly, Bobbitt denies that ethical argument has a pride of
place among the modes of argument because he believes that all of the
modes of argument must compete among themselves in constitutional
argument and interpretation.248 On Bobbitt's account, not only is there
no overriding mode or principle, but there must not be any such mode.249
For Dworkin, by contrast,250 rights are trumps, and moral argument will,
generally, itself trump, albeit with important limitations.251
At an even more fundamental level, Bobbitt's anti-foundational
account of law is incompatible with Dworkin's theory of value.252
Dworkin believes that right answers are objectively true.253  Bobbitt's
account of right answers eschews appeals to the objective world to verify
or confirm the truth of propositions of constitutional law and treats right
answers as historically contingent.254 Thus, despite the superficial
246. See, e.g., BOBBuTT, FATE, supra note 11, at 151-53 (arguing for an interpretation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause based upon a concept of limited constitutional
government as part of the fabric of ethical argument).
247. Thus, for example, Dworkin argues that the moral interpretation of the
Constitution imposes limits on the death penalty and on penalizing consensual sodomy.
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) (defending Dworkin's law as integrity theory by
offering a series of constitutional interpretations drawing on that theory's commitment to
moral theory as a source of legal authority); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985) (defending Dworkin's more general claims, amplifying the arguments made in
Taking Rights Seriously, and anticipating the comprehensive theory of Law's Empire).
248. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at x.
249. See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 31-42; BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 11, at 4-5 (describing the primacy of the practice of argument); see also
Balkin & Levinson, Grammar, supra note 33, at 1794 ("No reader.., can miss Bobbitt's
passion in arguing for the equality of [the six modes of argument's] status.").
250. See RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, Hard Cases].
251. Dworkin limits the recourse to moral argument in his theory of law as integrity
because that theory balances the competing desiderata of justice with those of fairness.
The latter requires settled rules of law to protect expectations and permit private ordering.
See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29.
252. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 89; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at
94.
253. See RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119, 119 (1985) (arguing that there is indeed one right answer,
even to hard legal questions).
254. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 94-95 (emphasizing that ethical
arguments are grounded in the particular American experience and society).
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similarities between Bobbitt's recognition of the place of ethical
argument in our constitutional law and Dworkin's account of the role of
moral theory and moral argument in his account of the Constitution,
there are profound, fundamental differences between the two theories.
Bobbitt's account of constitutional argument has been criticized for
failing to explain what happens when modes collide. While he
acknowledges this criticism of Constitutional Fate, he purports to offer
such an account in Constitutional Interpretation.255  According to
Bobbitt, a judge faced with conflicting modes of argument must exercise
her faculty of judgment to choose an outcome.256 He offers no analysis
of how such a choice can or should be made.257
Bobbitt is not alone in failing to explain how normative judgments
are made. The reliance on subjective preferences in classical economic
theory is, after all, a means of avoiding an explanation of how choice is
made by otherwise ostensibly rational actors. Hume's claim that reason
is the servant of our passions is one way to articulate this stance.258
While that black box model of subjective preferences has had its critics,
it has also been accepted as offering a valuable contribution to our
understanding of actions and choices.259 Bobbitt's failure to further
detail the decision process when the modes of argument conflict, ought
not to be treated as an insuperable objection to his account.
Patterson's account of legal argument is more prosaic than
Bobbitt's260 and accords argument a non-exclusive role in constituting
law.26' Patterson is not committed to the indeterminacy of the modes of
argument, and his account of argument itself draws on accepted accounts
of informal argument.262 Patterson suggests, most simply, that questions
about propositions of law are resolved by an examination of the grounds
for a claim, the warrant that explains how the grounds are relevant, and
255. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xv.
256. See id. at 178-86.
257. Bobbitt refers to exercising the faculty of conscience in such event, but does not
explain any more about how this might work. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at 158-60 (arguing that conflict among the modes of argument creates the potential for
justice).
258. See HUME, TREATISE, supra note 222.
259. Classical Humean ethics, in its distinction between reason and desire, makes
desire and taste wholly a subjective matter, immune to the demands and dictates of
reason. While some critics have argued against that separation, it has not generally been
thought.a disqualification of the theory per se.
260. See PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 170-79.
261. Id. at 178-79. Patterson suggests that the underlying agreements are as
important as the forms of argument.
262. See generally PATrERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 170-71 (looking to Stephen
Toulmin's theoretical description of informal argument).
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the nature of the claim itself.263 Despite the formality with which
Patterson diagrams this scheme, he never falls into the trap of suggesting
that grounds and warrants can provide a formal basis for a claim. His
formalization simply describes the social practice.264
5. The Core Anti-Foundational, Anti-Representational Claims
In summary, the anti-foundational, anti-representational position
makes four key claims with respect to the Constitution and American
constitutional law. First, it asserts that the Constitution has no existence
independent of our practice. To the extent that we get a constitutional
question right, it is not a matter of correctly interpreting an objective
Constitution to which we may look for an answer to the constitutional
question or controversy at hand. Second, without an objective,
independent Constitution to which judges and constitutional interpreters
may turn, the classical doctrine that the truth of propositions of
constitutional law arises from a correspondence with such an
independent, objective Constitution must be rejected. In its place,
however, we do not have the result defended by the nihilists and, often,
critical legal studies2 65: the absence of any Constitution at all. Instead,
we have a practice of constitutional law. That practice is sufficiently
formal and rule-governed that we ordinarily know whether an argument
is legitimate; we also often know when an argument is persuasive-
although this is more often a matter on which judgments may differ.
With respect to the meaning of propositions of constitutional law, the
anti-representational claim must be shaped by focusing upon the
performative nature of the Constitution and constitutional judicial
opinions and upon the role of such propositions in practical reasoning
about the Constitution and our republic. Because the Constitution does
things by saying things, any interpretation or application of it must take
that predominant performative role into account.2 66  Because the
Constitution and constitutional decisions are expressed by propositions,
those performative statements are employed as premises and
263. Id.
264. Id. at 174 (noting that in legal arguments "there may be dispute over what is to
count as an appropriate measure for the criterion of choice among conflicting forms of
argument").
265. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
266. The performative role is predominant but not exclusive. Jack Balkin's
description of the non-legal, aspirational role of the Constitution is instructive in this
regard. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 62-63 (arguing that constitutional aspirationalism is
"Janus-faced," both recognizing the failures and limits of our current law but also
recognizing the potential for improvement).
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consequences in practical reasoning about the Constitution and
constitutional law as part of that practice.
The preceding analysis has focused upon the claims made by
Bobbitt and Patterson and the arguments that they advance for those
claims. It is helpful to explore whether other constitutional theorists
ought also to be included within the anti-foundationalist, anti-
representationalist camp. Laurence Tribe is sometime categorized as
falling into this category.267 More generally, theorists who defend a
complex, pluralistic canon of interpretation, like Daniel Farber and
Suzanna Sherry, have also been so characterized.68 Inclusion of those
theorists may obscure more than it reveals about the anti-representational
position. Tribe certainly sometimes appears to endorse elements of the
anti-representational account. For example, when he eschews a general
theory of constitutional interpretation, he appears to endorse Bobbitt's
claim that the Constitution is a matter of the arguments that we make and
that we accept.269  But Tribe's general structure for his account of
American constitutional law emphasizes an historical evolution.
270
Moreover, confronting the current state of constitutional doctrine, he has
asserted that there is a new absence of conceptual consistency that makes
writing a treatise about constitutional law impossible.27' Tribe's
criticism cannot be reconciled with a model of the Constitution that
reduces our law to the arguments that are made and accepted.
Finally, it may appear that the anti-representational, anti-
foundational position falls within or very close to the claims that have
been advanced by the criticisms of the critical legal theorists.7 The
enthusiasm for Rorty's anti-representational position may suggest such
an assimilation.273 The claims advanced here are more consonant with
Bobbitt than with the critical legal theorists for at least two important
267. See Laurence Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 208, at
72-73 [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation].
268. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002)
(criticizing Bork and Justice Scalia, among others, for attempting to construct an overly
conceptual and systematic constitutional theory).
269. See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 2677, at 65; LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF,
READING].
270. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 201.
271. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291, 294-95
(2005).
272. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 265 (defending the claim that although law does not
have foundations and cannot determine outcomes independent of political choices
informed by the interests of the politically and economically powerful, legal nihilism is
not entailed thereby); Tushnet, supra note 265.
273. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 265, at 7 n.13.
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reasons.274 First, a central claim of the critical legal studies theorists is
that law may be reduced to an expression and implement of existing
power relations in the law-bound society.275 Bobbitt asserts expressly
that no such reduction is possible.276 It is the latter position that is
defended here. Second, and more fundamentally, the premise of
Bobbitt's theory, also defended here, is that there is a special domain of
law.277 Critical legal studies theorists, by virtue of their commitment to
the reductionist claim described above, are committed to the view that
there is no independent domain of law.278 The reductive account of law
is an implausible account of constitutional practice. The anti-
foundational, anti-representational account defended here is not itself
reducible to the theory of law defended by critical legal studies
proponents.
B. Arguments Against the Anti-Foundationalist Claims
The anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist claims that Bobbitt
and Patterson make are controversial.279 While Bobbitt's claims received
significant attention when they first appeared beginning in 1980 and
1982,28o much of the response from constitutional scholars was
critical,281 and the jurisprudence community largely ignored his
274. Bobbitt dismisses the position adopted by critical legal studies. BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 164-66. The critical legal studies proponents may be
considered Young Rortians in comparison to the views defended by Bobbitt and me.
275. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 265, at 6.
276. Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1233-34 (1989).
277. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 22 (characterizing constitutional
arguments made outside the identified six modes as without legal import); Charles Fried,
The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 55-56
(1981). While Bobbitt criticized Fried as falling into "philosopher envy," I think Fried
captures the notion of the independence of law, if not the source of that independence and
the relationship of law to philosophy quite accurately-and not inconsistently with
Bobbitt's own position. BOBBII, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 174. See also
Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2011) [hereinafter
Fried, On Judgment]. I am grateful to Professor Fried for making available to me a pre-
publication copy of this article.
278. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 265, at 6.
279. Compare PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 11, at 165, with DWORKIN, ROBES,
supra note 2, at 37-39. Moreover, the representational theory, despite its powerful
critics, remains the dominant view in contemporary analytic philosophy. See PRICE,
supra note 16, at 304 (acknowledging the dominant position of representationalism).
280. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11; Bobbitt, supra note 1. For an example of the
critical response, see, e.g., Symposium: Philip Bobbitt and Constitutional Law, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1703 (1994) (representing a generally enthusiastic response of a variety of leading
constitutional commentators to Constitutional Fate and Constitutional Interpretation).
281. See generally Gudridge, supra note 50, at 1969 (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982)) ("It is easy, upon first reading, to characterize
Constitutional Fate as simply a 'bad' book."). Gudridge goes on to temper his
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282claims. In particular, Bobbitt's claims have been largely ignored in
the past roughly 35 years of the debate over originalism.283  In the
jurisprudential context, for example, Dworkin expressly rejects the anti-
foundationalist, anti-representationalist account that Bobbitt endorses.284
It is valuable to look closely at Dworkin's argument against an anti-
representationalist account of language and knowledge and the related
arguments of Hilary Putnam that Dworkin cites.285  Dworkin endorses
traditional concepts of truth and traditional realist ontology.286
assessment, characterizing the work as a "provocation." Id. See generally Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Giving Substance Its Due, 93 YALE L.J. 171 (1983) (reviewing PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982)). Bobbitt complains about the response to
Constitutional Fate in Constitutional Interpretation. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 2, at xi.
282. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 1. But see LEITER, Quine, supra note 19.
283. For example, none of Bork, Justice Scalia, or Barnett address Bobbitt's claims
on behalf of the originalists, nor do Dworkin, Posner, or Sunstein among the critics.
Bobbitt bears some responsibility for the failure of his theory, as his style is at once
dense, cryptic, and subtle. He often appears to conflate entirely independent claims, and
it is very difficult to extract from his seminal Constitutional Fate a clear understanding of
the relationship of the various theses he advances. For example, it is not easy to discern
the nature of the relationship between his anti-foundational account of constitutional
argument with the modes of argument that Bobbitt identifies. Similarly, it is not always
clear what the relationship of his account of the so-called ethical form of argument with
that account, as he sometimes asserts that ethical argument is necessary under his
account, a claim he does not apparently make about the other forms of argument. While
it is clear that such necessity is historically contingent, given the novelty and
controversiality of Bobbitt's inclusion of ethical argument, it is not clear, for example,
whether his entire theory must collapse if we reject ethical argument as a necessary or
even possible form of constitutional argument.
Bobbitt's enterprise often has the flavor of a Kantian effort to make a place for
ethical argument in constitutional law. Cf IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
(Norman Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin's Press unabr. ed. 1965) (1781) (defining the
limits of reason and knowledge, with the consequence, if not the goal, of creating a place
for God).
The failure of Bobbitt's theory to be accepted more broadly may also be
attributable to Bobbitt's limited sitzfleisch. Since advancing his claims in Constitutional
Fate and Constitutional Interpretation and a very few articles in the same period, for the
past 20 years or so, Bobbitt has abandoned this field. Perhaps Bobbitt has had a change
of heart. But if not, because the claims are so controversial and because they rely on
philosophical claims that are themselves controversial, the defense of Bobbitt's claims
probably requires further effort. It is also possible that there is a sociological dimension
to Bobbitt's failure, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
284. See DwORKiN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 37-39.
285. See generally DwORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29.
286. See, e.g., DwORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 36-41; see also Dworkin, Arduous,
supra note 86, at 1253-54. As Dworkin criticizes Rorty's anti-foundationalist rejection
of correspondence with an external world, he implicitly commits to the contrary view that
the concept to an external world does meaningful work for us and that just the
correspondence notion of truth that Rorty rejects is also accurate. Moreover, Dworkin
asserts a similar realist position with respect to morality. He believes that there are
atemporal moral truths about the world, not just temporal consensus from time to time
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Dworkin's more traditional position becomes clearest in his
criticism of Richard Rorty,287 but the criticisms themselves apply equally
to anti-foundationalists like Bobbitt and Patterson.288  Dworkin
challenges modem pragmatism and selects Rorty as pragmatism's
leading proponent. Dworkin's attention to this admittedly "abstract
philosophical" debate289 highlights the apparent implications of his
ontological and other philosophical commitments. Dworkin makes two
principal arguments. The first attacks the pragmatic, anti-
representationalist position in its starkest form. The second attempts to
block a potential rehabilitation of that theory. While Dworkin directs
these criticisms against Rorty, they are also applicable to the anti-
representational, anti-foundational account of constitutional law that
Bobbitt defends.
Dworkin begins by attributing to Rorty the position that we must
abandon the view that any legal, moral, or scientific inquiry is an attempt
to discover what is really there.29° Instead, inquiry is experimental and
pragmatic; it is an effort to discover what works, and what we
collectively conclude works.29' Indeed, although Dworkin does not here
make reference to it, this deflationist account is accompanied for Rorty
by a denial of classical concepts of truth.292 Acknowledging that this
theory appears novel and exciting, Dworkin nevertheless asserts that it is
"philosophically a dog's dinner.29 3 Dworkin appears to believe that as a
pragmatist, Rorty is simply a garden variety skeptic, no more worthy of
about moral truth. Thus, Dworkin's Right Answer thesis appears ultimately to be a
realist claim about the world, and not just about us.
287. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 36-40. Here, I will use Dworkin's
criticism of Rorty as a proxy for his likely disagreement with Bobbitt because the two
have not engaged directly. This may overstate the force of the realist defense. Some who
reject representational theories of the truth of propositions of law do so on the basis of a
distinction between natural and social facts. See Patterson, Social Fact, supra note 101,
at 583-84. This distinction creates the possibility that Dworkin's realism is true with
respect to the natural world, yet false with respect to the social world.
288. See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xix-xx n.1; PATTERSON,
TRUTH, supra note 11, at 179. In particular, Dworkin's defense of a correspondence
theory of truth and his rejection of the anti-foundational account of our discourse as
incoherent would apply equally to Bobbitt and Patterson.
289. DwORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 36.
290. Id. at 37 ("Rorty says that we must give up the idea that legal or moral or even
scientific inquiry is an attempt to discover what is really so, what the law really is, what
texts really mean, which institutions are really just, or what the universe is really like.").
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY & PASCAL ENGEL, WHAT'S THE USE OF TRUTH?
(2007). In one of his last statements of his views on truth, Rorty explains why and how
he thinks we can and should dispense with the philosophical and foundational use of
truth-talk.
293. DwoRKiN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 37 (citing a secondhand description of a
critique by Hilary Putnam).
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current respect han Descartes' demon294 or David Hume."' Dworkin
brings this point home with his example of our discourse about the height
of Mount Everest. Surely, Dworkin implies, we must recognize that the
mountain is out there and is not merely a construct of how we get about
or how we talk about mountain-sense-data.296 Thus, Dworkin offers a
linguistic variation of Samuel Johnston's kick.297
Dworkin asserts that Rorty's views are incoherent.298 He attributes
to Rorty the view that our claims to represent he world are mistaken, i.e.
that our propositions about the world and our propositions about our
propositions about the world are mistaken. In Dworkin's view, if there is
no way of telling whether there is a world out there, then there is no way
of denying that the goal of inquiry is to describe the world out there.299
There can be no way to disavow the statements about the world because
we have no "view from nowhere" from which to make the denial. In his
restatement of Rorty's argument, Dworkin first appears to restate
ordinary understanding: we think wars are or are not unjust and that
judicial opinions are or are not correct.300 These intuitions, reflected and
instantiated in our language, according to Dworkin, make our language
more useful to us, and we would be nearly lost were we to abandon it.
According to Dworkin, Rorty would have us abandon our talk of what is
out there.301  Although Dworkin asserts that our commitment to these
views, freighted with ontological commitments, is of critical importance
294. See DESCARTES, supra note 14, at 144-49 (describing radical Cartesian doubt
that our entire experience and understanding of the world is mistaken, induced in us by a
powerful evil demon).
295. See DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § 4
(Charles W. Hendel ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 8th prtg. 1955) (1748).
296. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 40 ("Given how we go on, the height of
the mountain is not determined by how we go on but by masses of earth and stone.").
Rorty might restate this description as: "Given how we go on, we go on as if the height
of the mountain is determined by masses of earth and stone." Dworkin needs to give
some practical significance to the different formulations if he is to cast doubt on Rorty's
claim that there is no such significance.
297. See Hallett, supra note 61 (exploring Johnson's purported refutation of
Berkeley's idealism with a physical act).
298. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 37.
299. Id. This criticism relies expressly on Williams's own critique of Rorty.
Williams has himself criticized Rorty's view of truth and inquiry on just this basis. See
also BERNARD A. 0. WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 58-59, 128-31 (2002);
Williams, supra note 7.
300. DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 37-38. Although Dworkin states these
judgments in casual, vernacular terms, appealing to the moral intuitions of his moral
community, he implicitly rejects a relativistic view that such judgments are local, rather
than universal. Absent such implicit moral absolutism, the strong sense in which
Dworkin endorses such judgments-and the contrast with the relativist Rorty-would be
lost.
301. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 95-97.
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to us, he never explains why.3" 2 Dworkin believes that Rorty either
rejects these claims or commits to them in a way that is manifestly
untenable.
Dworkin offers an anticipatory rebuttal of a rehabilitation of the
anti-representationalist view. In this argument, Dworkin relies heavily
on a view of language that he advances only tacitly and never defends
expressly. 3 3  It is necessary, therefore, to begin by articulating that
theory. Dworkin anticipates that Rorty will argue that Dworkin
misunderstands the levels at which we speak.304  Further, Rorty
implicitly distinguishes commonsense speech and philosophical speech,
allowing the latter to stand and only rejecting the claims of the former in
its account of representation and the ontological commitments that it
makes .3° ' Dworkin acknowledges that our practices carry realist
ontological commitments, but he endorses those claims.30 6 He argues
that an attempt to employ a distinction between ordinary and
philosophical discourse in order to rehabilitate Rorty's pragmatism fails
because the attempt to distinguish the ontological commitments of
ordinary language and those of the philosopher cannot succeed. 307
Dworkin's model of language makes two critical assumptions.
First, Dworkin assimilates all linguistic expressions and usages to a
single model.30 8 That is a model in which meanings exist and are given
by the use, broadly defined, of the linguistic expressions.3 9 On this
account, philosophical propositions claim their legitimacy from their
philosophical use; Second, Dworkin discounts the role of metaphor in
our thinking and language.31° Metaphor for Dworkin is largely a murky
technique for masking problems and blocking analysis.311 This theory of
language figures prominently in Dworkin's criticism of Rorty. For
example, with respect to philosophical language Dworkin asserts:
Language can only take its sense from the social events, expectations,
and forms in which it figures, a fact summarized in the rough but
familiar slogan that the key to meaning is use. That is true not only of
302. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 37.
303. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 38-40; R.M. DWORKIN, Introduction, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977); Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note
2, at 95-96.
304. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 38-41.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 37-38 (attributing ontological commitments to realism in our science
talk, ethics talk, and law talk).
307. See id. at 38-39.
308. See id. at 39.
309. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 39.




the ordinary, working part of our language, but of all of it, the
philosophical as well as the mundane.
312
Dworkin is similarly confident about metaphor: "[I]f the pragmatist
explained his heated metaphors, he would have to fall back on the
mundane language of ordinary life, and then he would not, after all, have
distinguished the bad philosophers from the ordinary lawyer or scientist
or person of conviction.,313  Dworkin appears to take this view of
language as self-evident, but that confidence is misplaced.314
The grounding of meanings in practices, however, according to
Dworkin, entails that there is no philosophical context in which
ontological commitments arise distinct from those of ordinary language.
Dworkin has thus attributed to Rorty what is ultimately a skeptical
position: that we cannot speak of truth or of our representations of the
world as mirroring the world because we cannot know that world. It is
most natural to characterize this error as epistemological: Rorty,
according to Dworkin, has succumbed to Cartesian skepticism.
Putnam frames his related criticism of Rorty a little differently. For
Putnam, Rorty's error is relativism, not skepticism.315 The best argument
that Rorty is a relativist or skeptic is that he is compelled into that
position by his rejection of an account of the relationship between our
knowledge and language and the external world.3 16 For the realist, the
only alternative is a sterile skepticism. But this move is not available to
Putnam, who also eschews realism in its classic forms.317 So how does
Putnam tag Rorty as a relativist? He argues that Rorty's emphasis of the
claim that there is no truth but only better or worse ways of thinking and
speaking, as viewed by a consensus of our historical cultural peers,
commits Rorty to relativism. Rorty's privileging of the views of our
peers, Putnam suggests, must be disconnected from, and is incompatible
312. Id. at 39.
313. Id. at41.
314. Dworkin's theory is unnecessarily Tractarian. The Wittgenstein Dworkin looks
to would be the one reflected in Wittgenstein's early works, like the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, not the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Without express
defense, Dworkin appears to reject or discount the concerns about philosophical
discourse and its linguistic pathologies that the latter Wittgenstein explored so
provocatively and, for many, persuasively. Dworkin claims a far more au courant
philosophy of language grounding his jurisprudence, but his foundationalism and moral
absolutism belie that claim.
315. See PuTNAM, REALISM, supra note 18, at 24-25 ("I think, in short, that the
attempt to say thatfrom a God's-Eye View there is no God's-Eye view is still there, under
all that wrapping.").
316. See id. at 21, 24-25 (appealing to the existence of a "fact of the matter" to
highlight Rorty's alleged relativism).
317. Id. at26-28.
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with, any non-relativist theory of what is better or worse, and thus Rorty
finds himself trapped in relativism. 318 Rorty rejects this argument, too.
319
Rorty denies that our language pictures or mirrors the world.32°
Rorty would likely answer Dworkin's claim that his account fails to do
justice to the ontological status of the mountain by pointing out that our
mountain talk cannot be imagined or understood without he context of
what we are, who we are, what we value, and how we live. In a very
important sense, it is not about the mountain. Rorty addressed just this
objection directly:
Searle sometimes writes as if philosophers who, like myself, do not
believe in "mind-independent reality" must deny that there were
mountains before people had the idea of "mountain" in their minds or
the word "mountain" in their language. But nobody denies that ....
What... I believe is that it is pointless to ask whether there really are
mountains or whether it is merely convenient for us to talk about
mountains.
321
Rorty amplifies this point by noting that the ways in which it is
convenient to talk about mountains also commits us to the view that the
mountains were there before us.3 22 To put the matter another way, Rorty
would concede that the world acts upon us as it does upon the bar-headed
geese flying around Mount Everest as they migrate through the
318. Putnam writes:
[Rorty's] concept of 'coping better' is not the concept of there being better and
worse norms and standards at all. Just as it is internal to our picture of warrant
that warrant is logically independent of the opinion of the majority of our
cultural peers, so it is internal to our picture of 'reform' that whether the
outcome of a change is good (reform) or bad (the opposite) is logically
independent of whether it seems good or bad.
Id. at 24.
319. RORTY, Menace, supra note 112, at 49.
320. That narrative of epistemology and iscourse, after all, is so central to Rorty's
philosophy, that it is how the thesis of Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
might be summarized.
321. 3 RICHARD. RORTY, John Searle on Realism and Relativism, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS: TRUTH AND PROGRESS 63, 72 (1998) [hereinafter RORTY, Searle]. Robert
Brandom probably does the job of answering this objection. See also ROBERT B.
BRANDOM, Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY 116, 125-27
(2011).
322. See RORTY, Searle, supra note 321, at 72. Rorty argues that our use of
language assume and employ all of the usual features of mountains. All he denies is that
it is helpful or fruitful to purport to ask questions about the reality that corresponds to
such claims. Whether there is such a reality, or whether we have only our talk, is a




323Himalayas. But that causal action is not translatable into linguistic
constraints through accounts of better or more accurate representation.
For Rorty, our language is only another stimulus response not
fundamentally dissimilar to the non-linguistic navigational techniques of
the geese. This helps explain the great difference between Dworkin and
Rorty on metaphor. Metaphor, for Rorty, is an important linguistic
technique, precisely because it offers us the potential for redescription.
24
That redescription offers us new ways to construct narratives and other
accounts about ourselves and others. It does not matter that the metaphor
is not "literally true" because that reproach is one that Rorty disavows.325
Does such a perspective on language and the world commit Rorty to
relativism as Putnam suggests and Dworkin asserts? Rorty does not
claim that we can assess the utility or pragmatic value of claims or
propositions relatively. Within a time-instantiated community there are
theories and interpretations that are judged better or worse than others; in
some cases, one may be best.326  Moreover, such judgments are not
always static; some of the community's views on such questions evolve
over time. For example, the general theory of relativity explains light,
gravity, and motion better than Newtonian physics. In constitutional law
there is virtual unanimity in the community that Brown is a better
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment than Plessy. There is no
implicit relativity in these judgments, although there may be a tacit
acknowledgment that the community may find yet a better theory or
interpretation.327 That makes Rorty a relativist or an anti-realist only if
one believes that there is a perspective available to us today that makes
other judgments meaningful or possible. That is one of the things I
understand Rorty to deny. So it appears that Dworkin largely
misunderstands Rorty when he suggests that Rorty would deny that our
true propositions in a given language represent the world accurately or
323. Thus, Rorty writes: "One way of formulating the pragmatist position is to say
that the pragmatist recognizes relations of justification holding between beliefs and
desires, and relations of causation holding between these beliefs and desires and other
items in the universe, but no relations of representation. 1 RICHARD RORTY, Inquiry as
Recontextualization, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH
93, 97 (1991).
324. See id. at 94-95.
325. Rorty rejects the model of representation. See RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10,
at 3, 6, 9.
326. I intend agnosticism as to whether constitutional questions have a right answer
as Dworkin claims. See DwORKIN, Hard Cases, supra note 250.
327. Of course, the grounds on which constitutional interpretations may evolve
varies among the different positions in the debate over originalism, with originalists
generally limiting the sources of flux more severely than their critics. See generally
Andr6 LeDuc, Originalism's Implications, Part II.C (Sept.: 14, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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truthfully.328 If this defense works, then Dworkin's challenge to the anti-
foundational, anti-representational narrative fails for want of its own
Archimedean point from which to establish a relativist characterization.
But Dworkin is not the only critic of Rorty's anti-foundationalism
and anti-representationalism.329  Alvin Goldman, one of the more
thoughtful, if ferocious, critics, articulates three principal arguments
against Rorty's claims.330  Goldman's first argument is similar to
Dworkin's argument from the existence of mountains.33' But Goldman
makes the argument somewhat more effectively with the example of an
undersea range, which he claims would exist without regard to whether
anyone ever discovered it.332 Moreover, Goldman makes the argument
against the social construction of truth more expressly and in more
variety than Dworkin. In particular, Goldman makes two additional
arguments against the social construction argument for Rorty's anti-
representational account.333 First, he argues that a sociological account
can never capture the concept of knowledge within a community.334 A
sociological account of human actors' behavior, without reference to
physical scientific concepts, cannot provide the same level of causal
explanation possible with such entities and scientific theory.335 Second,
Goldman argues that an account of knowledge that reduces knowledge to
the practice of a community generates an infinite regress.336 For each
truth constituted by a community consensus there must be another truth
that such consensus exists.
Second, Goldman attacks the argument against representationalism
that all accounts of the world are dependent upon language.3 7  Third,
328. See DWORKJN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 38-40; cf Rorty, Menace, supra note
112, at 49 (making very clear that Rorty denies not the assumptions about the nature of
mountains inherent in our ordinary mountain-talk, but the usefulness of adding a
philosophical gloss that explores the essence of mountains, or the correspondence-or
lack thereof-of our mountain-talk with the external world). Dworkin never engages
with Rorty on why he might believe such philosophical talk is useful. DWORKIN, ROBES,
supra note 2, at 38-40.
329. Indeed, Robert Brandom, a former student of Rorty and a pragmatist very
sympathetic to Rorty's project, characterized many in analytic philosophy as finding
Rorty's magnum opus, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature "off-putting and even
alarming." Brandom, Anti-Representationalism, supra note 18, at 190.
330. See GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 10-22, 26-33.
331. See DwORKIN, ROBES, supra note 2, at 40; GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note
7, at 12.
332. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 12.
333. Id. at 10-17.
334. Id. at 14-15.
335. Id. Note that this argument from scientific knowledge would not appear
applicable in the context of social facts and our practices with respect thereto.
336. Id. at 16-17.
337. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 17-22.
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and finally, Goldman argues that the denial of epistemic privilege offered
by Rorty misses the mark because it challenges only infallibilist
theories.338 Goldman notes that such theories have been abandoned and
replaced with fallibilist theories that rely upon accounts of warrant and
justification.339 Believing that we now have an account of knowledge
that represents the world, Goldman concludes that Rorty's attack fails.340
At this stage, it is helpful to consider the contemporary reply offered by
Robert Brandom.341 Brandom acknowledges the developments in
reliabilism and the brilliance of Goldman's work.342 Brandom
nevertheless rejects the representational account, at least in substantial
measure.343 Without attempting to recapitulate Brandom's argument, I
offer that he rejects the account on the basis that Goldman's reliabilism
doesn't deliver the naturalized epistemology and representational
account of truth that Goldman promises.344 That is because nothing in
the world provides the conditions sufficient to permit a hypothetical
observer to be recognized as reliable.
Fortunately, I do not have to score this debate here or declare a
winning position. For my purpose in this Article, all that is necessary is
to establish that there are grounds to doubt the traditional
representational account of language, and that those grounds are
particularly powerful with respect to our talk of the Constitution and the
text of the Constitution. If it turns out that a representational account of
the Constitution and other social facts is the best account, then the
originalist debate may be revived. That is a risk I am prepared to assume
in the argument hat follows.
C. Assessing the Anti-Foundational Account of Language and Truth
The realist attack on the anti-representational account of language
and anti-foundational account of language and knowledge remains a live
debate within philosophy, and it is not possible to claim that there is a
338. Id. at 26-27 (suggesting that Rorty attacked a straw man because the
weaknesses in such theories was "old news" in 1979, when Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature was published).
339. Id. at 27-28. Goldman's intensity is perhaps attributable, at least in part, to his
own role in that evolution. See Alvin I. Goldman, Discrimination and Perceptual
Knowledge, 73 J. PHIL. 770 (1976). The suggestion that Rorty was unaware of this work
appears misplaced, however, as Rorty engaged directly with this work in his teaching at
Princeton in the mid-1970's.
340. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 28.
341. See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70, at 112-17.
342. Id. at 113, 115 (characterizing Goldman's 1976 article as "epoch-making").
343. See Brandom, Anti-Representationalism, supra note 18.
344. See BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70, at 115-17.
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manifest outcome to the ongoing philosophical debate.3 45  For the
purposes of this Article, it is enough to conclude that the anti-
foundational, anti-representational account has a number of defenders
and that a number of arguments can be made in its defense. The claims
of such a theory are strong enough to explore its implications for the
debate over originalism. Moreover, a weak version of this theory, which
applies only to certain kinds of discourse relating to social facts, is
sufficient to support the use of such anti-representational theory with
respect to propositions of constitutional law. That version of the theory
would appear immune to several of the principal arguments against the
stronger, more general theory.
The anti-representational account of the language of our
constitutional discourse and decision making explains why the claims of
the originalists and their critics are misdirected. There is no objective
Constitution to which judges may turn to find answers to the
constitutional controversies with which they are confronted. The task is
not a matter of being better historians so as to discover the truth of the
original understanding of a constitutional provision or the original
intentions or the original expectations with respect thereto. Such
historical narratives are not irrelevant; they have a long standing and
respected place in our constitutional arguments. It is hard to imagine that
we would cease to care about such original understandings, intentions,
and expectations. That might occur with the passage of time, or as the
result of intervening events, however.346  In some sense, we can
understand the adoption of the reconstruction Amendments as reflecting
just such a decisive break with the Founding Generation's views on race
345. See, e.g., Brandom, Anti-Representationalism, supra note 18, at 190
(distinguishing local expressivism, which dispenses with representational theories of
language with respect to a particular type of discourse, and global expressivism, which
purports to discard a representational account with respect to all language). See generally
PRICE, supra note 16; GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 10-22, 26-33;
McDOWELL, supra note 18 (characterized by Brandom as a brilliant effort to rehabilitate
the concepts of experience and linguistic representation after Rorty's attack thereon);
RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10.
346. To see this possibility, consider the import of the Civil War with respect to the
pre-Reconstruction-Amendment perspective on States' rights. As a result of the Civil
War and the decisive refutation of the claim that States, having given their consent-or,
more precisely, whose citizens gave consent through ratifying conventions -to join and
thereby constitute the United States of America, could withdraw without the consent of
the United States, the role of States' rights was forever changed, and the original
understandings, expectations and intentions with respect thereto-whatever they may
have been-have been eclipsed.
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and slavery. Such a break might also occur as a matter of constitutional
adjudication.347
On the anti-representational account of propositions of
constitutional law, there is no non-trivial truth--or falsity-with respect
to propositions of constitutional law. There are better and worse
interpretations, and better and worse propositions of constitutional law.
But the dimension on which such value is to be determined is as
performative statements and as conceptual statements that figure in the
space of practical reasons. That is, such propositions are to be judged on
the basis of what they do, on the one hand, and on the basis of what
practical reasoning supports them and what practical inferences follow
from them.348 Moreover, those judgments are to be made within the
partially formalized practices of constitutional interpretation, application,
and adjudication.
II. THE ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE AND THE END OF THE
ORIGINALISM DEBATE
In this section, I will first defend the claim that when the error
underlying the originalism debate is identified and abjured, the debate
over originalism effectively collapses.349 Second, I present and reject the
potential rebuttal arguments that may be made from originalist and non-
originalist positions against the end of the originalism debate.
A. Why the Debate Collapses
The argument that the debate over originalism collapses in the face
of the anti-foundational, anti-representational challenge makes a
prescriptive, not a descriptive claim; the originalism debate, judging only
by the number of participants and the volume of the contributions, is
robust.350 Nevertheless, once the implications of the anti-foundational,
anti-representational stance are understood, the debate ought to be
347. Bruce Ackerman famously argues that such breaks are more common than
generally recognized and are not confined to constitutional amendment. See ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 49.
348. For a defense of the primacy of judgment, within the parameters of
constitutional doctrine, see Fried, On Judgment, supra note 277.
349. Although Bobbitt asserts that the two sides share a fundamental, erroneous
premise, he never expressly explores the implications of that claim for the originalism
debate.
350. See generally, e.g., JOHN 0. MCGINNIs & MICHAEL B. RAPPOPORT, ORIGINALISM
AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); BALKIN, supra note 1, at 17-20 ; BENNETT &
SOLUM, supra note 219; Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1
(2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law, Research Paper No.
07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1120244##.
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abandoned. It ought to be abandoned because d fending the claims of
the respective sides to privilege particular modes of constitutional
argument and to delegitimize other modes of argument is a fool's errand.
The anti-foundational challenge directed against the originalism
debate unfolds in two stages. First, both substantive positions are
undermined by the anti-foundational stance. Second, Bobbitt and
Patterson reject the model of an objective Constitution that is to be
properly represented by our constitutional discourse in favor of their
respective models of social practice. I will examine each line of
argument in turn.
1. Challenging the Competing Claims of the Debate
At least four of the principal arguments offered for originalism fail
without the benefit of foundational, representational premises. First,
fidelity to original meanings is unnecessary to legitimate or justify
judicial review because no such independent legitimization is required or
possible.35 1  According to Bobbitt, there is no problem with the
legitimacy of judicial review and no need, or even any ability, to
legitimate judicial review outside of our constitutional practice. Second,
appeals to the original understandings are not any more neutral or
otherwise properly entitled to be privileged such that they are prior to, or
preferred to, the other forms of constitutional argument.352 For Bobbitt,
such modes of argument stand as equals in the practice of constitutional
argument and decision.353 Third, the semantic meaning claims made for
originalism are overstated and untenable.354 Bobbitt denies that semantic
meanings capture the import of the constitutional text.355 Fourth, the
formal account of constitutional argument offered by originalism is
untenable.356 Bobbitt's account of the nature of constitutional argument,
as we have seen, cannot be reduced to a matter of syllogism.357 Thus,
351. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 33-34 (citing Bork's claim that
originalism is necessary to cabin judicial discretion in constitutional decision).
352. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11 , at 5-8.
353. See id.; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xiv-xv.
354. See Solum, supra note 350.
355. Bobbitt should be understood to deny the exclusive import of semantic
meanings precisely because his typology of constitutional arguments permits recourse to
nonsemantic elements and the use of those nonsemantic terms in the application of the
constitutional provision in decision. That methodology is inconsistent with a semantic
project; indeed, it goes beyond ordinary pragmatics as well.
356. See BORK, supra note 61, at 162-63 (describing constitutional argument as
taking the form of a formal syllogism, with the major premise furnished from the
constitutional text).
357. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 3-8.
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Bobbitt denies the principal arguments made for originalism by its
proponents.
The anti-foundational, anti-representational stance also undermines
the positions taken by the principal critics of originalism. The account of
a pluralistic practice of constitutional argument rebuts the position of all
of the critics of originalism who would replace the original
understandings, expectations, and intentions with another privileged
form of argument. For example, Bobbitt rejects the argument Ely makes
for the primacy of democracy enhancement.358 He does not deny such a
mode of structural and ethical argument a place; he denies it a privileged
place in our constitutional discourse.359 Similarly, he rejects the position
taken by Cass Sunstein that the test of what works is the final test of
constitutional argument.360 Again, he does not deny such prudential
argument a place; he only denies prudential argument a privileged
place.361 Bobbitt also rejects modes of argument excluded by his catalog
of the permissible modes of constitutional argument. Thus, for example,
he rejects Dworkin's argument that hard cases require recourse to moral
arguments.362  Bobbitt denies that moral arguments have a place in
constitutional argument.363 Bobbitt also rejects the argument made by
Jefferson Powell: that appeals to the original understanding are
historically flawed.36 In the context of Bobbitt's modes of constitutional
argument, the practice of appealing to the original understandings is
accepted; it is irrelevant whether, as a historical fact, the original actors
contemplated such appeals.
3 65
But the anti-foundational, anti-representational account of the
Constitution does not simply discredit the substantive positions of
originalism and its critics; the effect is more fundamental. The anti-
foundational position challenges the account of law and of the truth of
358. See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 74-77.
359. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 74-92.
360. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 13.
361. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 59-73.
362. See DwoRKrN, EMPIRE, supra note 29, at 254-58.
363. See BOBBITr, FATE, supra note 11, at 94-96 (distinguishing his concept of
ethical argument and implicitly rejecting a place for moral argument in constitutional
argument).
364. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).
365. This claim perhaps merits a precise statement in light of Bobbitt's example of
Crosskey. The ultimate rejection of Crosskey's claims as to the scope of the Commerce
Power would appear to reflect some importance as to the validity of the historical claims.
See WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953). Thus, while it does not matter whether the project of looking to
original meanings was endorsed by the originalists, it does matter what the substantive
original understandings, expectations, and intentions were.
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propositions of constitutional law that underlies both sides of the
originalist debate. It is this second step that reveals the entire originalism
debate as grounded on a shared error.366  That error is a
representationalist account of law, in which propositions of law are true
insofar as they correctly represent states of affairs in the world.3 67 The
principal debate between originalists and their critics, such as Dworkin
and Tribe, is what states of affairs in the world are mirrored by true
statements of constitutional law.368  Bobbitt's challenge is more
fundamental, suggesting that there is no such representation or
correspondence and that statements of constitutional law are true only
insofar as they are accepted in the practice of constitutional
interpretation.369
Although it is easy enough to understand Bobbitt's claim that there
are no truth conditions in the world for propositions of constitutional law,
it is more difficult to understand its implications. Ordinarily, we think
we know what propositions are true, and what makes such propositions
true: facts about the Constitution. Anti-representationalists would deny
these propositions.370  But given the ongoing, intense controversy
surrounding these philosophical questions, I will not attempt a resolution
366. Bobbitt asserts:
It was my conviction, expressed in Constitutional Fate, that what the left and
the right share in this debate is a fundamental epistemological mistake. Each of
these perspectives assumes that law-statements are statements about the world
(like the statements of science) and thus must be verified by a correspondence
with facts about the world.
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii. It is unclear whether Bobbitt is implicitly
endorsing the claim that science-statements correspond to facts about the world, or
whether that view is instead within the quotational mode. Bobbitt's position on that
question is likely irrelevant to my current inquiry. Bobbitt, however, explores the support
for this view only very briefly with a reference to the work of Richard Rorty. Id. at xix-
xx n. 1.
367. See id. at xix-xx n. 1. Bobbitt is not the only observer to characterize the debate
over originalism as grounded on a shared error. See also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note
11, at 129, 149-50 (endorsing Bobbitt's claim that the debate over the legitimacy of
judicial review is grounded on a shared philosophical error).
368. See supra Part I.
369. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii, xix-xx n. 1.
370. See, e.g., P.F. Strawson, Truth, 24 ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 129 (1950) ("Mr. Austin
offers us a purified version of the correspondence version of truth . . . . The
correspondence theory requires not purification but elimination."); Donald Davidson,
True to the Facts, 66 J. PHIL. 748 (1969); DONALD DAVIDSON, A Coherence Theory of
Truth and Knowledge, in SUBJECTIVE, INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 137 (2001); Donald
Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, Afterthoughts, 1987, in
READING RORTY 134, 134-37 (Alan R. Malachowski ed., 1990); RICHARD RORTY,
Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth, in TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 333, 333 (Ernest
LePore ed., 1986) ("Davidson does not want to see truth identified with anything. He
also does not want to view sentences as 'made true' by anything-neither knowers or
speakers on the one hand nor 'the world' on the other.").
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here.371  Nor need we do so; it is sufficient for our purposes to
acknowledge the ongoing debate and the claims made for the anti-
representationalist stance. Put more expressly, propositions of
constitutional law are true or false (or the equivalent of true or false) by
virtue of their place in the practice of constitutional discourse. Although
Bobbitt is not express on this point, there is a historicity in this
definition, too.372 Put somewhat formally, propositions of constitutional
law are true for a community C at a time T.
Bobbitt argues that law is an activity of argument and endorsement
and that the truth of propositions of constitutional law inheres only in
their acceptance by the relevant constitutional communities. Bobbitt is
right that originalists and their critics share a common, fundamental view
of what makes these law-statements true or false: the world.373 So if
Bobbitt can undermine the foundation on which the disagreement is
based, he can perhaps transcend the debate. Thus, Bobbitt seeks not only
to discredit the originalist position but also to rebut the traditional
challenges to originalism. In so doing, he sets the stage for us to move
beyond the originalism debate.
Bobbitt rejects the originalist claims for the relative privilege of the
originalist enterprise without rejecting the originalist forms of
argument.374 He believes that attention to the linguistic analysis of the
constitutional text and to the historical understanding of that text are both
valid and legitimate methods of constitutional argument.375 He denies
only that those methods stand on higher ground than the other four
371. See generally TRUTH (Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999)
(collecting recent leading articles in the ongoing debate about truth within analytic
philosophy).
372. Bobbitt's account must be historical because his characterization of the modes
of constitutional argument is as contingent, historical modes. Thus, he believes that he is
describing how constitutional arguments are made and the Constitution is applied and
interpreted at a particular time. He acknowledges that those modes could change,
although his account of how that might happen is not very clear. Thus he writes:
"[T]here have been and I expect that there will be changes in the number and
composition of the modalities." Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 36, at 1919. Ultimately,
Bobbitt's account is a post-Hegelian account of our social practices, and as such, rejects
the notion of ahistorical truth or knowledge.
373. Id. at xix-xx n. 1 ("I reject both of these positions, and indeed believe them to be
unified in an unspoken expectation that meanings of legal propositions are given by the
conditions that render them true or false."). Bobbitt also believes that we commit an
ontological error when we reify law rather than recognizing it simply as an important
human activity. Id. at 24.
374. Exclusive originalism argues that only the original intentions, expectations, and
understandings with respect to the constitutional text are privileged as authority. Weaker
forms of originalism privilege those same original intentions, expectations and
understandings in weaker and more limited ways.
375. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 5-8.
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
methods of constitutional argument that he also identifies.376 Bobbitt's
account of constitutional argument trumps the originalist account as a
matter of description. Constitutional argument has the complexity and
richness that Bobbitt describes. Moreover, Bobbitt's account captures
the not uncommon feature that the kinds of arguments that are made in
constitutional cases often do not speak directly to each other. A
prudential argument, for example, does not rebut a textual argument to a
different conclusion or outcome. The originalists, by contrast, concede
the descriptive failure of their theory on the basis that much of what
passes for constitutional argument is simply illegitimate.
The originalist is committed to the view that the truth of
propositions of constitutional law is determined by the correspondence of
those propositions with the original understanding of one or more
provisions of the Constitution. The originalist's critic, by contrast,
generally believes that the truth of such propositions is determined by the
correspondence of such propositions with various facts in the world.
377
For Tribe, the correspondence would appear to be with certain just states
of the world as understood from a twentieth or twenty-first century legal
liberalist perspective.378 For Dworkin, the correspondence is with certain
Rawls-theoretic states of justice.379
It may yet be unclear how the anti-foundational, anti-
representational claims defended above relate to the debate about
originalism. How do the answers to the questions whether truth exists,
and whether truth consists of correspondence with the external world,
relate to the resolution of the various seemingly unrelated issues joined
in the debate over originalism? If the originalists are wrong about the
truth conditions for propositions of constitutional law, what import will
that have for the controversy? Put another way, the originalists and their
376. See id.
377. The relevant facts in the world vary with the critic's theoretical stance. For
Posner, for example, the correspondence would appear to be with various wealth-
maximized economic descriptions of the world. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). More recently Posner has been taken to back off from
this claim. See Richard Posner, Problematics, supra note 193, at 1670 (acknowledging
Dworkin's criticism and characterizing his effort as doomed). But see GILBERT HARMAN,
Explaining Value, in EXPLAINING VALUE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 196,
209-10 (2000) (questioning why Dworkin's argument ought to be persuasive because
some moral theory explanations, like that of the double effect, are viewed as important
even though they do not explain why the theory holds).
378. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, at vii-ix (1985) (describing his
Constitutional Choices as a work defending choices in substantive, value-laden
constitutional commitments). Of course, if the alternative, anti-foundationalist
interpretation of Tribe's position is correct, then perhaps this representationalist account
is mistaken along with the foundationalist account.
379. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 29, at 405-07.
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critics disagree about what the Constitution means, and they disagree
about what arguments count for the meaning of a constitutional
provision. So long as they continue to disagree about that, whether or
not those disagreements also entail that they disagree about truth
conditions, the debate would appear likely to persist. Perhaps the
originalists and their critics are mistaken about the nature of truth, or the
world, or the existence of leprechauns; how would correcting any of
those errors eliminate the debate? Bobbitt never explains his claim that it
would.380
Bobbitt's implicit argument may be that his model of multiple,
unordered modes of constitutional argument obviates the implicit
competing truth claims of the debate's participants. If it is neither the
case that a proposition of constitutional law is true if and only if it is
consistent with the original understanding, nor the case that such a
proposition is true if established by Dworkin's law-as-integrity theory,
for example, then the debate is radically reoriented. It has been replaced,
under Bobbitt's theory, with a practice of constitutional argument that
results in outcomes of varying degrees of scope and confidence and
evolves over time. Debates about conformity with prior linguistic
practices or understanding thus become beside the point.
Bobbitt denies the claims of originalism without endorsing the
claims of its critics by disavowing the foundations of the dispute.
Originalism's critics believe that the truth of propositions of
constitutional law consists in those propositions corresponding to certain
states of affairs in the world. 381  For originalists, a proposition of
constitutional law is true if the expectations or semantic understandings
of the Founders would have been consistent with that proposition of law
or would have entailed its truth. For example, consider the following
Originalist Proposition ("OP"):
The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit all capital
punishment.
This statement is true if and only if the text of the Eighth
Amendment, prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments,
were understood by the relevant linguistic community not to prohibit
capital punishment. OP is true if and only if "cruel and unusual
punishments" as used in the Eighth Amendment did not include capital
punishment. This account is thus fundamentally a semantic account. It
380. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii-xiii.
381. See, e.g., Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 92-93, 92 ("[I]t is an objective
matter-a matter of how things really are-that genocide is wrong."); DWORKIN, ROBES,
supra note 2, at 37-38; see TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 269, at 17 (criticizing
Dworkin as untrue to the Constitution).
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does not ask what something is, only how the linguistic community uses
the words comprising the constitutional text. Thus, the facts about the
world to which the truth of the proposition of constitutional law
corresponds are linguistic facts. They are therefore facts about the
original actors' social practices.
Dworkin asserts that the truth value of OP is determined not by its
correspondence with certain facts relating the linguistic usage and
understanding of the Founders but by the nature of capital punishment.
If capital punishment is not cruel and unusual, that is, if on a correct
moral theory that defines what it is to be cruel, capital punishment is not
cruel, then the proposition is true. The linguistic practices of the
Founders are relevant, but do not stand, from Dworkin's perspective, in a
position of priority to other linguistic communities. Fundamentally
Dworkin's is a realist theory, and he would contrast it expressly with
relativist theories.382 Dworkin's theory of law as integrity is committed
to the claim that there is a right answer, legally as well as morally.
383
But both originalism and Dworkin are committed to the view that there
are facts in the world that make propositions of constitutional law true.
Dworkin is hardly alone among originalism's critics in his realism.
Powell's criticism of originalism's commitment to the original
understandings takes a tacit realist stance in its reliance on historical fact
to rebut the originalist project.384 The historical fact is adduced to rebut
the originalist claim. 385 Similarly, Posner's criticism of originalism is
predicated on the premise that there i an answer to the constitutional
question being confronted, and that such an answer exists not as a matter
of social practice but as a matter of reality.386 For Posner, the relevant
reality is not in the constitutional text as originally understood. Rather
the answer arises through the application of a complex algorithm that is,
382. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 95-96 (giving the example of the
existence of mountains to support his realist claims).
383. See RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985). Dworkin's moral realism has been criticized from a
variety of perspectives. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and
Jurisprudence in the 21s Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 175 (2004) (arguing that
Dworkin's moral realism is naive and fails to take into account metaethical thinking
about moral relativism). Many might be surprised by Leiter's invocation of the
importance of metaethical analysis.
384. See Powell, supra note 364, at 886. An alternative interpretation would be that
Powell is simply demonstrating the inherent self-contradiction in the originalist project.
385. Id. at 886-87.
386. Posner, Bork, supra note 86, at 1380. I analyze Posner's philosophical




broadly speaking, utilitarian.387  A proposition of constitutional law is
true if it corresponds to social, economic, and political behavior that
maximizes wealth (or optimizes some other set of social goods).381
Bobbitt, by contrast, denies that facts about the matter make
propositions of constitutional law true.389  Instead, assuming Bobbitt
would employ truth talk, OP is true if the courts employ legitimate
arguments to that conclusion and, perhaps, other constitutional
commentators endorse those arguments and conclusions. Neither the
originalists' original understanding nor Dworkin's moral theory is
controlling. Indeed, except to the extent that a moral theory has been
incorporated into a national ethos, it would appear not to support any
constitutional legal argument in Bobbitt's world.39° If the complex,
linguistic claims of Bobbitt can be sustained, he has offered a novel
reconstruction of the interpretive project and largely eliminated the
controversy over originalism. To be right, however, it would appear that
the anti-representationalist account of language and meaning would need
to prevail.
2. The Alternative Model of the Constitution
Turning to the second line of argument against the debate, Bobbitt
denies originalist arguments and methods preeminence for two principal
reasons. First, Bobbitt believes that all of the identified modes of
argument are equally legitimate. As a matter again of contingent,
historical fact, he believes that each of the modes is reflected in
established constitutional argument.391  Each mode can provide the
determinative argument in a particular case. None is paramount,
however.392 Bobbitt's description of our constitutional practice appears
387. It is not precisely utilitarian, at least in Posner's early work, as it maximizes
wealth rather than utility.
388. Posner, Bork, supra note 86, at 1380.
389. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii ("[W]hat the left and right
share in this debate [over originalism] is a fundamental epistemological mistake. Each of
these perspectives assumes that law-statements are statements about he world (like
statements of science) and thus must be verified by a correspondence with facts about the
world.").
390. That conclusion follows from Bobbitt's claim that, at present, these six
modalities are exclusive and no constitutional argument may be made except within these
modes. Even if moral argument is embedded in the American ethos, however, Bobbitt's
ethical argument looks only to that ethos itself, not the embedded moral theory.
391. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6 ("This suggests that arguments are
conventions, that they could be different, but that then we would be different."). It is not
clear that Bobbitt intends to commit to a view of convention here that is to do any
philosophical work.
392. Bobbitt links preference of particular modes to style. Id. at 8 ("It will become
apparent that what is usually called the style of a particular judge, as well as different
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accurate. Second, Bobbitt believes as a matter of the nature of the
practice, there cannot be a dominant mode. The practice is the only
means by which constitutional meanings are articulated and formed;
those meanings have no prior or independent existence.393 Thus, on
Bobbitt's view, it would apparently be misguided to look for a
foundation to our constitutional practices.
It follows from the claim that our constitutional law inheres in the
argumentative practices of the Court with respect to the interpretation,
construction, and application of the Constitution that we cannot ground
those practices-which include the practice of judicial review, a central
element in the process of constitutional argument-in a necessary
recourse to the original understanding of the Constitution. The practice
of judicial review is an element in our social practices that constitute our
Constitution. It cannot, and need not, be grounded in the interpretative
understanding on adoption of the Constitution or a relevant Amendment.
Skeptical critics may question Bobbitt's account. For example, if
the adoption of a constitutional amendment is not controlling as to the
relevant constitutional subject matter, then how does Bobbitt account for
how the democratic adoption of a constitutional amendment works?
More fundamentally, what is the significance of having a written
Constitution? That question calls up Justice Scalia's plaintive question
of why, if we are to employ such open-ended methods of constitutional
interpretation and construction as the non-originalists defend, did we not
just choose to write constitutional poetry?394 Bobbitt would surely reply
that his account of our constitutional practice presumes a written
Constitution.395 Thus, Bobbitt notes, perhaps somewhat cryptically:
notions of style in particular eras, can be explained as a preference for one type of
argument over others.").
393. For Bobbitt, constitutional law is no different in this respect from the arcane
statutory law of tax-free corporate reorganizations. Cf Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on
Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 879 (1982) ("[T]here is no
natural law of reverse triangular mergers."). Notwithstanding Isenbergh, the entire
corpus of the classical law of tax-free corporate reorganizations is premised on the
existence of a fundamental distinction between sales of businesses and mere
readjustments of a continuing corporate enterprise. See generally AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (William D. Andrews,
reporter 1982). Isenbergh may be best understood as endorsing the American Law
Institute's law reform challenge to that distinction between corporate sales and corporate
reorganizations.
394. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 208. The written Constitution creates
the basis for the textual mode of argument. And poetry is rarely performative.
395. Constitutional practice in the United Kingdom, which has no written
constitution, is very different. Bobbitt's account is very much a description of the
American Constitution and of our constitutional practice. This is clearest when Bobbitt




There is no constitutional legal argument outside these modalities.
Outside these forms, a proposition about the US Constitution can be a
fact, or be elegant, or be amusing or even poetic, and although such
assessments exist as legal statements in some possible legal world,
they are not actualized in our legal world.
396
Bobbitt's description of constitutional discourse, focusing on its
richness, complexity, and even the inconsistent results that may be
derived from the disparate modes of argument, stands as an implicit
rebuke of the originalist position.397  Originalists expressly deny
legitimacy to a majority of the modes of constitutional argument
described in Constitutional Fate.398 Thus, the first, fundamental conflict
is over the validity and legitimacy of the modes of argument other than
the textual and historical. Second, even if a weaker form of originalism
would permit a role for such arguments, that role is secondary to the
overriding original meaning analysis. Bobbitt insists not only that there
is no such hierarchy among the arguments but also that there cannot be
an algorithm or principle to harmonize the theories when they conflict.
399
Originalists do not dispute that alternative types of argument are
made.400 Precedential or doctrinal arguments are often acknowledged by
certain originalists.4 1 But to a large extent, the use of such arguments is
effectively, or even expressly, characterized as illegitimate.
40 2
396. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 22. Bobbitt claims that our modes
of constitutional argument are historical and local, shaped by the history of our relevant
practices within our constitutional republic. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6
("[Constitutional] arguments are conventions.., they could be different, but.... then we
would be different.").
397. Equally, it rejects originalism's critics because Bobbitt's model includes
historical and textual argument as dispositive modes of constitutional argument.
398. Originalists would accept the historical and textual arguments, and reject
structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical modes of argument.
399. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 155-62. In Bobbitt's theory
such modes exist independently, without a meta-theory or meta-mode that harmonizes
them, because of Bobbitt's anti-foundationalism. If such a theory existed, it would
fundamentally change the practice. Instead of being an open-ended process,
constitutional interpretation and decision making would be itself reduced to a
foundational algorithm. That is, there would be a decision process that could provide
outcomes. Id. at 160-62; see also supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. Bobbitt
rejects that possibility because of his model of constitutional law and his insistence on the
role ofjudgment. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 161-62.
400. See generally Frank Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 479, 485 (1995) (denying that such other positions offer a plausible
alternative to originalism because nonoriginalist theories arrogate power to the judiciary
in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution and the principles of our democratic
republic).
401. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 208, at 139-40. That argument
for precedent appears grudging and prudential rather than principled.
402. See id.
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Originalists have never responded directly to Bobbitt's argument, so it is
unclear how their argument would go. One of the sources of uncertainty
is the apparent willingness of originalists to employ alternative modes
themselves. Justice Scalia is willing to strike down a contemporary
criminal statute prescribing whipping as a punishment, even if contrary
to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment.4 °3 What type of
argument would Scalia find compelling? The candidates would, in
Bobbitt's universe, appear to be doctrinal or ethical; the prudential and
textual would appear ineffectual and the structural argument irrelevant.
Justice Scalia repeatedly asserts that a law providing for whipping would
be struck down-hardly a controversial claim. Implicitly, Justice Scalia
endorses that result. But he never explains how or why it would be
struck down. It would appear that one or both of the ethical or doctrinal
arguments are what Justice Scalia finds persuasive and authoritative.
The reader is necessarily left perplexed by the unstated contrast between
lashing and the death penalty for Justice Scalia. Both punishments were
not infrequently imposed in colonial America-both were clearly
contemplated as permissible punishments under the Bill of Rights. Yet
Justice Scalia regards it as clear that one is prohibited today and equally
clear that the other is not.4 °4  The death penalty's significant
contemporary public support would appear to have no significance as a
legal, constitutional matter for Justice Scalia.
Nevertheless, originalism responds to Bobbitt's fundamental claim
that the multiple modes of constitutional argument stand without an
ordering by arguing that such an approach is undemocratic and
inconsistent with the supremacy of the democratic will expressed
through the legislature. Bobbitt's answer is that the originalist's implicit
appeal to the facts of the Constitution in the world has no currency. It is
403. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CON. L. REv. 849, 861
(1989). That acceptance is merely reported rather than defended or explained. Two
defenses obviously unavailable to Justice Scalia are the public consensus that has evolved
on the question or the moral theories that would reject such forms of punishment, because
both are expressly illegitimate sources of constitutional law.
404. Originalist critics of Justice Scalia's "faint-hearted" originalism would suggest
perhaps that the reconciliation lies in affirming the constitutionality of lashing and that
Scalia's error consists in not maintaining the courage of his convictions. For such an
approach (without, I should hasten to add, expressly endorsing lashing), see Randy
Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L.
REv. 7 (2006). It is possible the Justice Scalia would focus on the express mention of
capital punishment in the Constitution (as lashing is not) to explain the difference in
treatment. But it is not easy to see how that distinction should be accorded such
significance in a semantic intention originalism. The mention of capital motion or the
silence with respect to lashing and the stocks in a text would appear of little moment for
an interpretative method looking to semantic meanings.
[Vol. 119:1
THE ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE
not that the Constitution is only what we say it is, but that the
Constitution is what the legitimating practice makes it.
To defend his claims about the primacy of constitutional practice,
Bobbitt compares the U.S. Constitution with the former Soviet
Constitution.405 He does so to emphasize the contrast between
constitutional semantics and constitutional practice. It is the latter that
counts, for Bobbitt. The U.S. Constitution is not more sweeping or
promising in its language guaranteeing individual rights; the Soviet
Constitution was bolder and broader on paper.4 °6 Rather, the U.S.
Constitution is more sweeping and powerful in its practice and in the role
it is accorded in the community's legal and political practice. Thus, for
example, when the U.S. Supreme Court said that the taking of the Steel
Mills during the Korean War was unconstitutional,4 7 the control of the
mills reverted to their rightful managers and owners.40 8 When the
Supreme Court intervened in the 2000 presidential election,40 9 the
outcome stood-without street rallies or violence, if not without
objection.410  It is this dimension of practice that Bobbitt finds
paramount-the ability of our legitimating constitutional practice to
channel and resolve fundamental disagreements.411 The originalists want
405. See also BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xvii (referring to the
Stalinist invocation of objective truth with respect o the regime's "monstrous lies").
406. See, e.g., Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Chapter 7: The Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the USSR,
BUCKNELL.EDU,
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77consO2.html#chap07 (last visited
June 24, 2014) (including Art. 41, right to rest and leisure; Art. 42, right to health care;
Art. 46, right to cultural activities; Art. 47, right to artistic expression; all such rights
were ostensibly guaranteed at a time of totalitarian suppression of individual freedoms
well-established in the West).
407. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (holding
no constitutional authority existed for the President to take control of the privately-owned
United States steel mills to insure continuing steel production in the face of strikes).
408. See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 900-02 (1992); see also GARRY
WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE
126-27 (2010) (analyzing Truman's seizure of the steel mills as a development in, and
symptom of, the evolution of the Executive Branch's arrogation of unconstitutional
powers in a nuclear bomb era). Wills captures the importance of this decision in
highlighting the tensions incident to the rise of the national security state.
409. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reversing a state-ordered
recount of ballots and finding that no recount could be constitutionally sufficient,
effectively determining the outcome of the 2000 presidential election).
410. For a sample of the controversy, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BUSH V.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (2002) (passionate, if not intemperate, discussions
of the Supreme Court's role in the contested U.S. presidential election); DWORKIN,
ROBES, supra note 2, at 94-.104.
411. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11.
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to replace this practice of argument with deference to an historical
text.412
It may be that the originalists were almost right. That is, the
sweeping decisions of the Warren Court may have tested the limits of our
constitutional fabric. Certainly, there was great stress in the South over
the assault on segregation and criticism more generally of the expansion
of protected speech and defendants' rights. But we do not know the
answer to the implicit counterfactual conditional questions; what we do
know is that the practice remains intact. We have no accepted
touchstone beyond our practice to which we may turn in interpreting the
Constitution and deciding constitutional cases.
To recapitulate, to the extent that the proponents of originalism
believe themselves to be arguing for its exclusive role-and against a
valid role for the other modes of argument-Bobbitt believes they are
wrong. Although Bobbitt does not make his argument expressly, it
would appear that he believes that the error in the originalist argument
for exclusivity is to believe that a document can carry its own
interpretive instructions and that it can be self-interpreting.41 3 Can the
originalist argument for exclusivity be rehabilitated with an interpretive
canon from outside the text? Bobbitt's response is that no such
interpretive canon can be any more authoritative than the existing
practice of constitutional argument and interpretation. It is that existing
practice of constitutional interpretational adjudication that originalism
seeks to discredit and overthrow with its claims to priority and
exclusivity. That argument appears to fail, to the extent Bobbitt's
reduction of legitimacy to practice stands. The proponents of originalism
need to explain why they are not standing in Achilles's shoes in Lewis
Carroll's delightful logic fable.414
B. The Protagonists' Defense of the Debate
Protagonists on both sides of the originalism debate have defended
or would defend the vitality of that debate415 in the face of the anti-
foundational, anti-representational challenge. But that defense has been
412. For a related criticism of the impossibility of such deference, see GOLDFORD,
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 15 (" We-always and necessarily we--decide ... ").
413. I have explored that originalist argument, and the reasons to doubt it, in another
article. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 1.
414. See Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 MIND 278 (1895)
(whimsically demonstrating that even the rules of logic cannot easily be demonstrated
logically to be true); see also Andr6 LeDuc, What Were They Thinking?
Reconceptualizing the Originalism Debate, Part II.B.1 (July 15, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
415. See, e.g., BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 219.
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largely tacit and performative: they have simply continued the debate,
without much attention to the anti-foundational, anti-representational
challenge.41 6  I will suggest the arguments that might be made to
continue the debate. The most fundamental challenge comes from
Dworkin, who disputes the anti-representational premise.4 17 I have
explored those arguments in the preceding sections and will not develop
them further here.418
Reconstructing the various originalist responses to the anti-
foundational challenge is difficult because key originalists nowhere
address the anti-representational challenge.419 Nevertheless, confronted
with the radical anti-representational, anti-foundational challenge
outlined above, the originalists must deny those claims and assert the
validity of their tacit foundational and representational account. Natural
law originalism offers the first response that should be considered. That
response is similar to natural law's response to legal positivism. Natural
law is ahistorical and noncontingent, independent of the human societies
that it governs. If such a law exists, then it exists apart from our human
practices and beliefs. The anti-foundationalist account of constitutional
law in terms of our practices cannot describe such natural law. Natural
law originalists argue that in denying the existence of such a law the anti-
foundationalists are implicitly stripping much of our constitutional law
talk of meaning because when we talk about such law, either to endorse a
claim or to deny it, we are implicitly relying upon natural law as our
touchstone. The anti-foundationalists deny that any such foundation is
needed to make sense of our law talk. The natural law originalists
simply reply that the only alternative to reliance upon such a foundation
of natural law is an arbitrary, relativist theory that fails to capture the
absolute majesty of law in its timelessness, universality, and justice. To
the extent that the anti-foundational account is persuasive, natural law is
only another foundational account that must be rejected.
Positive law originalism might initially appear more receptive to the
anti-representational challenge. This approach argues that the
416. Id. at 59.
417. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 94-96. The originalists would appear
to endorse a similar strategy on different, intuitive grounds. It may appear obvious that
language represents the world. See, e.g., SIMON BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUIDE FOR THE
PERPLEXED 153 (2005) quoted in Price, supra note 16, at 304 n.2. The model of language
as representer and the mind as mirror is so well-established and dominant that its grip
goes almost unremarked. But see RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10. From its
commonsensical stance, this is a natural first response of originalism to the anti-
foundational challenge, but I am not sure that it has been previously made.
418. See discussion, supra Part I.B.
419. Bobbitt's works are not addressed, for example, by any of the leading
originalists such as Bork, Justice Scalia, and Randy Barnet. But see BENNETT & SOLUM,
supra note 219, at 58 59.
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
constitutional law is a matter of facts in the world, constituted by social
practices, including linguistic practices, and by the attitudes toward those
practices and expectations about them. So it might appear that the
disagreement between the positive law originalists and the anti-
representationalists is, as a matter of ontology, modest. In fact, the
disagreement is fundamental. Although the originalist constitutional law
is derived from social practices, originalists assert the objective nature of
our resulting constitutional law; that law cannot be reduced to social
practice and most certainly does not have the somewhat tentative nature
of Bobbitt's argument-based practice. The error of the anti-
foundationalists is in the failure to recognize, in the end, that our
Constitution has an existence independent of our practices. Put another
way, Bobbitt's error is in denying that law is something that we have as a
result of something we do.42°
For the originalists, law is something we have as a result of
something that the relevant founding actors did a long time ago. The
argument against Bobbitt's reductionism is never made express,
unfortunately. Originalists like Judge Bork and Justice Scalia appear
only to rely on common sense. The Constitution and our constitutional
law are manifest and real; those in doubt about the objective and
independent existence of Constitution can visit the National Archives.
Third, and finally, Larry Solum offers one of the most
philosophically sophisticated defenses of the originalist position and
expressly rejects the anti-foundational position.421 He does so, however,
by interpreting the anti-foundational account as asserting only that the
existence of the status quo, which employs various forms of
constitutional argument, imposes a burden of persuasion on originalism
to change that status quo.422 That is a profound misreading of the anti-
foundational, anti-representational rgument. Solum's brief discussion
leaves open the question whether he has misread that argument, or
whether he disagrees with it for reasons he never presents.423
Originalism's critics are equally keen to continue the debate but
also offer few express arguments against the anti-foundational challenge.
One exception, Brian Leiter, has challenged Bobbitt and Patterson's
claim that the debate over originalism turns on flawed, shared premises
420. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 24.
421. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 219, at 58-59.
422. Id. at 59.
423. Solum asserts only that Bobbitt has either fallen into conceptual confusion or
linguistic misunderstanding. See id. By that he means that Bobbitt has confused the
originalist 'is' with 'should.' Although Solum does so unselfconsciously, that claim
highlights the tenor of the debate over originalism that the arguments never engage. But
Bobbitt understands full well that the argument from original understanding cannot be
met, on its own terms, by a prudential or structural argument.
[Vol. 119:1
THE ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE
about the nature of language and truth.424 It is not clear what Leiter
rejects in Bobbitt's account.425  Certainly one could imagine a
constitutional debate about the role and legitimacy of judicial review
without commitments to a representational account of language and the
meaning of the Constitution. But Bobbitt is not denying that such a
debate would be possible; he is only claiming that the current debate is
grounded on a representational account.426 I have elsewhere argued why
Bobbitt is right that the protagonists in the debate are committed to a
427representationalist account.
Leiter ought perhaps to be read charitably as claiming that the
debate over originalism could be rehabilitated without representationalist
foundations. That is a potentially important claim, because if the debate
could be restated without the benefit of a foundational, representational
account, much of the force of Bobbitt's claim would be lost. It would be
possible to attempt to recast the debate about the role of the original
understandings and expectations not as a matter of the truth of
propositions about the Constitution expressed by reference to the
historical fact, vel non, of such historical understandings or expectations,
but as matter of the overall merits of an interpretation or, indeed, a
particular constitutional decision.
But recasting the originalist claim in a particular case as a
substantive claim as to the best outcome appears fundamentally
inconsistent with originalism's claim. Thus, such a recharacterization of
the originalist claim would not be a rehabilitation of our debate; it would
be the construction of a very different debate and one, moreover, in
which the originalists could participate only in a very different capacity.
It is fundamental to our debate over originalism that it purports to be
conducted within our constitutional practice, but relies upon a reified,
objective Constitution.428 Originalism, after all, does not propose a
424. LEITER, Quine, supra note 19, at 139 (denying that the debate over the
legitimacy of judicial review is driven by a mistaken theory of truth or that propositions
of constitutional law are statements about the world).
425. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 1 (defending the claim that
both sides in the debate over originalism share the premises that propositions of
constitutional law describe the world and that such propositions of law are true if they
describe that world accurately).
426. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xii.
427. I have argued this claim at some length, in the absence of much defense by
Bobbitt, in LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 1. The discussion here draws on
that analysis.
428. See BORK, supra note 61, at 164 (comparing the Constitution to the Ten
Commandments on a stone tablet to emphasize the unchanging nature of constitutional
law).
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revolution; it purports a restoration of the original Constitution.429
Therein lies the fundamental tension or incoherence that Bobbitt has
called out.430  To the extent that our Constitution inheres in our
constitutional practices, that strategy is incoherent, despite the pretense
to the restoration of the Constitution.
If recasting the originalism debate in general normative terms will
not work, is there another way the re-characterization might proceed?
What would a non-realist originalism look like? It is difficult to
construct that counterfactual world. The originalists do not want to
debate outcomes with their critics.43  They recognize that outcomes
under originalism may be unhappy, but believe such results are not
germane to the constitutional judicial decision making process.43 2
CONCLUSION
Four conclusions warrant recapitulation. First, there is a compelling
alternative, anti-foundational, anti-representational account of
constitutional law and constitutional argument that disputes the ontology
and theory of truth underlying the originalism debate-premises
generally shared by originalism and by its critics. That theory denies the
claim that there is a fact of the matter when we disagree about our claims
about the Constitution and what it says or requires. That does not entail
that there are not better and worse interpretations, better and worse
decisions, better and worse applications of the Constitution and accounts
thereof. There are. But the measure of excellence of a constitutional
decision or a constitutional interpretation is not a matter of its truth.
Second, such an anti-foundational account of our language, world,
and Constitution is controversial and, for those raised in a Cartesian,
representational world, counterintuitive.433 Nevertheless, for the reasons
429. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
430. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 11, at 6 (asserting that mastery of the grammar
of constitutional argument must be prior to invocation of those arguments).
431. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 208, at 44 (criticizing the
apparent dilution of the protection of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
in child abuse cases).
432. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2307 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing the threat to national security that the Court's decision creates as
another factor arguing against hat decisions).
433. The grip of the Cartesian premises has been made clear in the past several
centuries. See, e.g., RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 10 (articulating and then repudiating the
classical Cartesian philosophical project of understanding how our minds and our
language mirror the world); RYLE, supra note 221 (1949) (modem challenge to the
Cartesian mind-body dualism); G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller
trans., 1977) (1807) (classical groundbreaking historicist analysis of the social nature of
our knowledge); see Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 95-97 (criticizing Rorty's
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canvassed above, I think the anti-foundational, anti-representational
account is more plausible than the account offered by its critics for two
principal reasons. First, it better captures the nature of constitutional
argument and constitutional decision. It also explains the nature of
learning how to be a constitutional lawyer, which is as important as
learning the that of constitutional doctrine. Second, and more
importantly, the anti-representational account captures the performative
element of the Constitution and constitutional argument and decision.
While that performative dimension of the anti-representationalist account
is not articulated expressly by Bobbitt or Patterson, it is a helpful way of
restating the anti-representational account. It highlights the manifest
feature of the Constitution and of judicial decisions interpreting and
applying the Constitution; they are doing something as much as they are
saying something. That description must include the recognition that the
performatives of the Constitution also figure fundamentally in inferences
about the Constitution and constitutional questions. Thus, the theory
must also account for such inferential role for our Constitution talk.
The critics' arguments against this anti-representationalist account
are unpersuasive. Dworkin and Goldman, among others, offer
sophisticated arguments against that philosophical position, particularly
as it would apply to the natural world.434 But in relying on a traditional
realist notion that mountains and other subjects of our talk pre-exist, and
would have existed regardless of whether we had ever existed-a fortiori
whether we had ever spoken of themn35-Dworkin is vulnerable to the
reply that the anti-representationalists need not deny that the physical
phenomena would have occurred, only that such phenomena would not
have been recognizable as what we conceptualize as such things.
436
Without us, there would not have been a vocabulary by which we could
express the truths about such facts.43 7 It is not enough for Dworkin to
salvage the existence of facts if there are no true propositions that exist
independent of us and our vocabularies expressing those truths. The
realist claim must extend not just to the underlying facts but also to the
claim that talking about whether mountains exist in an independent reality is pointless);
see also supra Part I.B.
434. See supra Part I.B.
435. For a fair and pithy statement of this argument see ROBERT B. BRANDOM,
Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism, in PERSPECTIVES
ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY 116,125---27 (2011) (walking
back some of Rorty's more sweeping claims about the relationship of true statements and
the world).
436. Id.; see also BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 70, at 115-17.
437. For such a recharacterization of the anti-representationalist claim, see id.
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sentences that express truths about those facts.438 Without sentences that
can be true or false, the import of a realist claim about the world is of
little moment.439
Third, this anti-foundational challenge has not yet figured
significantly in the debate over originalism, either for the originalists or
for their critics. The silence is not easy to explain. For Dworkin, a
commitment to philosophical realism stands as a fundamental objection
to the anti-foundational challenge.440 But most of the critics expressly
endorse no such realist position and their indifference to the anti-
foundational arguments is pervasive.441 In the case of the originalists,
the even more complete indifference to the anti-foundational challenge is
apparently attributable to two sources. First is the originalist hostility to
modem philosophy.442 That hostility may lead originalists to reject the
anti-foundational challenge as freighted with a commitment to the anti-
representational ontology. Second, much originalism is untheoretical
and so does not easily engage directly with the more theoretical
articulation of the anti-foundational challenge.443 Nevertheless, it does
not follow that the originalist position is neutral or unphilosophical. The
originalists are also committed to a realist position,444 and that realism
and accompanying representational account of constitutional language
and the truth of propositions of constitutional law makes the debate over
originalism possible.
Fourth, and finally, this alternative, anti-foundational approach to
our constitutional ontology and our theory of the truth of propositions of
constitutional law offers the potential to dissolve the debate over
originalism by sapping the foundations on which it is built. The anti-
foundationalist challenge reveals the debate over originalism as not
unlike the effort to peel an onion to find its true essence. The originalists
would strip away all of the layers of non-originalist interpretation and
438. Without such true or false sentences, the place of the world in our discourse and
in our knowledge would appear problematic.
439. Leiter has also defended a realist account of constitutional laws. See BRIAN
LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2007); LEITER, Quine, supra note 19, at 137.
440. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 95-97.
441. See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 269. The commitment of such critics
to a realist account of the Constitution is often only implicit. See generally LeDuc,
Ontological Foundations, supra note 1.
442. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 208, at 45; BORK, supra note 61, at
251-59.
443. See Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REv. 611,
613 ("[Originalism] ... has prevailed without ever having a definitive formulation ... or
a definitive refutation of its critics.").
444. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, upra note 1.
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argument; the critics would, generally, discount or deprivilege the
powerful and intuitive originalist claims. In each case, as the layers are
removed, no true constitutional essence is found; indeed, no
constitutional law remains when the disparate modes of argument
catalogued by Bobbitt are harmonized in a purified theory.
Arguments may be made that the debate over originalism can
properly continue, of course, and in all likelihood it will surely do so.
Some protagonists, like Dworkin, have challenged the anti-
representational account itself.445  Leaving aside that frontal assault,
other protagonists have argued that the originalism debate makes no
commitment to a foundational, representational account, and thus the
challenge by Bobbitt and Patterson misses its mark.446 While it might be
possible to rehabilitate the debate over originalism without the
representational claims and commitment to an ontologically independent
Constitution on which it rests, the result would be a debate in which the
two sides must address the arguments each advance on their substantive
merits. Whether that is a radical restatement of our historic debate about
originalism or a new debate about how to apply the Constitution may be
a distinction that makes little difference.
If we transcend the methodological dispute of the debate over
originalism, we do not come to an end of constitutional discourse.
Rather, the constitutional discourse and debate returns to the underlying
disputes about the best judicial outcomes under our constitutional
practice. The protagonists in the debate over originalism disagree most
fundamentally about those substantive constitutional law outcomes.
Debating those substantive issues directly, rather than through the
medium of originalism and the opposing theories, is both more
straightforward and more likely to resolve the substantive constitutional
questions on the most plausible and persuasive grounds. Finally, this
seemingly philosophical approach to transcend the originalism debate
may appear to privilege philosophy and philosophical argument in a
manner inconsistent with a therapeutic model of philosophical analysis.
While that is not so, it is a topic for another day. 47
445. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2.
446. See generally LEITER, Quine, supra note 19.
447. See LeDuc, Relationship, supra note 2.
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